TOWARD ASSURANCE AND TRUST FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS by Chavis, Jeffrey S
TOWARD ASSURANCE AND TRUST FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
By 
Jeffrey S. Chavis 
A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Engineering 
Baltimore, Maryland 
April 2021 
© 2021 Jeffrey S. Chavis 
All rights reserved 
ii 
Abstract 
Kevin Ashton first used the term Internet of Things (IoT) in 1999 to describe a system in which 
objects in the physical world could be connected to the Internet by sensors. Since the inception of the 
term, the total number of Internet-connected devices has skyrocketed, resulting in their integration 
into every sector of society. Along with the convenience and functionality IoT devices introduce, there 
is serious concern regarding security, and the IoT security market has been slow to address 
fundamental security gaps. This dissertation explores some of these challenges in detail and proposes 
solutions that could make the IoT more secure. Because the challenges in IoT are broad, this work 
takes a broad view of securing the IoT. 
Each chapter in this dissertation explores particular aspects of security and privacy of the IoT, and 
introduces approaches to address them. We outline security threats related to IoT. We outline trends 
in the IoT market and explore opportunities to apply machine learning to protect IoT. We developed 
an IoT testbed to support IoT machine learning research. We propose a Connected Home Automated 
Security Monitor (CHASM) system that prevents devices from becoming invisible and uses machine 
learning to improve the security of the connected home and other connected domains. We extend 
the machine learning algorithms in CHASM to the network perimeter via a novel IoT edge sensor 
device. We assess the ways in which cybersecurity analytics will need to evolve and identify the 
potential role of government in promoting needed changes due to IoT adoptions. We applied 
supervised learning and deep learning classifiers to an IoT network connection log dataset to 
effectively identify varied botnet activity. We proposed a methodology, based on trust metrics and 
Delphic and Analytic Hierarchical Processes, to identify vulnerabilities in a supply chain and better 
quantify risk. We built a voice assistant for cyber in response to the increased rigor and associated 
cognitive load needed to maintain and protect IoT networks. 
Primary Reader and Advisor: Aviel Rubin 
Secondary Reader(s): Lanier Watkins, Anna Buczak, Anton Dahbora, and Matthew Green 
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This dissertation explores security challenges in the Internet of Things (IoT) in detail, and proposes 
solutions that will make these devices, systems built from them, and data residing on them more secure. 
Unlike many other technologies, the IoT space must address unique challenges and requirements that 
place significant constraints on possible solutions to problems. For this reason, we take a multi-prong 
approach to IoT security, considering aspects of technology, ecosystem, and policy [7]. 
Throughout this work, we will explore particular problems in depth and introduce novel technologies 
that provide solutions. Our work strives to create a more secure IoT-enabled smart system environment 
centered on the integration of the technologies proposed in this work. 
1.1 IoT Concepts and Definition 
The IoT is a concept in which everyday devices become more connected, making it possible for them 
to become smarter; processing becomes intelligent, and everyday communication becomes informative 
[8]. The term Internet of Things was first used in 1999 by British technology pioneer Kevin Ashton to 
describe a system in which objects in the physical world could be connected to the Internet by sensors 
[9]. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provides a description, rather than a 
definition: “The Internet of Things (IoT) is a rapidly evolving and expanding collection of diverse 
technologies that interact with the physical world” [10]. Although this might seem vague, the NIST 
description importantly captures the non-static nature of technologies and modalities of interaction with 
the tangible. However, for practitioners in different domains, such a description can be too loose and 
therefore not provide essential guidance. The questions arise: What technologies? And, how do these 
technologies interact? 
There is still no universally accepted definition for the IoT. For example, the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) view of the “Internet” considers the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) 
suite and non-TCP/IP suite as protocols and classifies “things” as people, machines, or information that 
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comprise the IoT that connects objects around us to provide seamless communication and contextual 
services provided by them [11]. On the other hand, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
defines the IoT as a global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by 
interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information and 
communication technologies [12]. The National IoT Strategy Dialogue recommended that “[t]he IoT 
consists of “things” (devices) connected through a network to the cloud (datacenter) from which data can 
be shared and analyzed to create value (solve problems or enable new capabilities)” [13]. The Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) has solicited help in developing a definition. They surveyed 
more than 12 international standards organizations and research bodies to curate a domain-neutral yet 
more granularly characterized description that is tailored to the underlying “things” of interest, scale, and 
operational needs—resulting in two definitions for small- and large-scale scenarios [14]. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the IoT is defined as all uniquely identifiable physical or virtual 
objects that exchange information with other uniquely identifiable physical or virtual objects via the 
Internet (or other communications network) and the evolving technology that supports this exchange as 
appropriate for the scale and operational needs. Figure 1-1 (from [15]) illustrates this IoT concept and its 
three constituent elements: 
1. Things – Objects in the physical or virtual world that can be identified and integrated into a 
communications network 
2. Devices – Digital equipment with the required capability to communicate and the optional capa-
bility of sensing, actuation, data storage, and data processing 
3. A communications network (e.g., the Internet) 
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Figure 1-1 Elements of the IoT Concept 
The IoT is already very large, consisting of billions of connected devices, and it is expected to grow by 
an order of magnitude by the end of the next decade [16]. 
The IoT will be an integral part of every sector of the U.S. economy and will substantially influence 
daily activities ranging from healthcare to transportation to provision of basic services. Smart grids, with 
automated sensors and control systems to achieve increased efficiency, will be integrated into 
transportation and public utility systems. Industrial processes will become increasingly dependent on 
automation and robotics, affecting the manufacturing, chemical, and defense sectors. Financial and legal 
institutions housing vast amounts of sensitive data will be increasingly equipped with IoT-enabled sensors 
and controls including security surveillance systems. Public health and emergency services will be 
increasingly connected to biometric and geolocation sensors to provide continuous monitoring of patient 
and first responder status. 
1.2 Security Concerns of the Internet of Things 
The IoT is more than the connection of an increasing number of “smart” devices. It is one of a number 
of technology evolutions that will radically alter the way machines communicate. In this sprit, it would be 
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impossible to assess the cybersecurity requirements of the emerging IoT without also considering the 
effects of the emerging fifth generation (5G) standard. Although IoT and 5G are independent entities, 
their development paths are intertwined. Two of three core 5G capabilities [Massive Machine-to-Machine 
(M2M) Communication and Extremely-Low-Latency and High-Reliability Communications] identified by 
the ITU relate specifically to the needs of IoT. Similarly, the potential for increased bandwidth, device-to-
device communications, and increased adoption of virtualization capabilities presented by the emerging 
5G standard will profoundly affect the shape of the IoT. The 5G-powered IoT will dramatically change how 
networks operate because capability will become increasingly distributed and virtualized and devices will 
operate more independently of traditional protective infrastructures, dynamically joining and leaving 
networks. We call attention to 5G’s significant impact here in the introduction to offer a complete 
assessment of IoT challenges; however, 5G is out of scope for this body of work as we focus on issues 
related more directly to IoT. 5G will be addressed in future work. 
We surveyed critical emerging capabilities, technologies, and trends associated with the IoT and 
identified a number of factors that could create novel and/or heightened cybersecurity risk: 
• Increased scale – The increased scale of IoT (i.e., more devices, more network traffic to be 
monitored) will increase the attack surface while stressing defenses. 
• Increased M2M communications – Increased dependence on M2M and device-to-device (D2D) 
communications will require adaptation of existing network security techniques to the increased 
number of devices with limited security operating on networks and increasingly dynamic network 
architectures. 
• Increasingly virtual networks – The ability to “stack” virtual networks within a physical network 
architecture will create new requirements and provide new opportunities for network security, 
as virtual networks within the same physical architecture may have unique quality-of-service 
(QoS) and security capabilities. 
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• Evolution from cloud computing structures to fog computing structures – As existing highly 
centralized cloud computing structures are replaced by more distributed fog computing, 
centralized security approaches will need to be updated to operate in a more distributed fashion 
with security applications operating at the edge and within clients on endpoint devices. 
• Increased physical risk – IoT devices operating in public view, such as security cameras, sensors, 
and controls, may be compromised by persons with physical access, and such compromises may 
have significant negative physical effects via IoT actuators. Indeed, the sheer number of these 
devices will mean broader exposure to supply chain risks. 
• Lower-cost, lower-power devices – The IoT is enabled by cost-effective devices with low power 
consumption connected to networks. Many of these devices will not have sufficient capacity to 
support the processing of intensive cybersecurity analytic capabilities, especially those involving 
machine learning. 
Notionally, cybersecurity risk can be expressed in the following equation, which illustrates why the 
IoT introduces an increased number of security threats [17]: 
𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 =  
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 ×  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 ×  𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑
 
For each device connected to the Internet (i.e., point of exposure), the cybersecurity risk is a function 
of the threat posed by the attack, the probability that a device will be attacked and the cybersecurity 
measures implemented (which reduce the risk). As a result, as the number of connected devices increases, 
the cybersecurity risk increases. In addition, as the number of connected devices and applications (e.g., 
healthcare, industrial control, smart cities) increases, the potential impacts of a cyber-attack also 
increases. As basic functions become increasingly dependent on IoT-enabled capabilities, hackers have 
more targets, and more opportunities, to inflict damage. In addition, as the technology stack becomes 
increasingly complex to support the often-divergent needs of IoT applications, new threats across the 
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stack become possible. Critically, each device targeted by cyber-attack becomes a new threat vector, 
enabling additional attacks on other network-connected devices. 
Cybersecurity vulnerabilities in IoT devices can be used to disable or modify IoT-enabled capabilities. 
An adversary might attempt to disable key industrial processes to inflict economic damage or disable 
critical safety mechanisms to cause physical harm. Conceivably, an adversary might attempt to exploit 
gaps in IoT cybersecurity to sabotage specific products or weapon systems or to disable vital public 
services including water, electricity, or communications. However, the point of attack may not be the 
ultimate target of a cybersecurity breach. Adversaries may attempt to exploit weaknesses in IoT 
cybersecurity in one organization or sector to gain access to important financial, legal, health, or other 
private data in another organization or sector. 
IoT solution architectures require multi-layered security approaches to provide complete end-to-end 
security from device to cloud and everything in between throughout the lifecycle of the solution. 
Foundational changes are emerging with the IoT that will expose critical networks to potential 
vulnerabilities. We feel a vision is needed to assess the likely impacts of the IoT and identify potential 
capabilities to respond to the likely emerging challenges of an increasingly distributed, virtual, and 
dynamic IoT cyber environment. 
1.3 Vision and Approach 
The set of issues identified and described above cover multiple areas; thus, solutions to these 
concerns must go beyond the technical realm, requiring a multifaceted approach that examines the issues 
from multiple perspectives. Our vision is to explore these issues from the perspective of technology, the 
supporting ecosystem, and related polices that govern how IoT is implemented. This dissertation explores 
each issue and introduces approaches, processes, and techniques that can be deployed in IoT settings that 
work toward addressing each of these unique challenges. 
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1.3.1 Connected Home Automated Security Monitor (CHASM): Protecting IoT Through Application of 
Machine Learning [1] 
The IoT will dramatically transform the home experience, but it presents significant security risks. We 
propose a system that helps reduce the cognitive load on a user in keeping their smart home network 
protected. The system helps prevent IoT devices from becoming invisible or forgotten by the user and 
provides semi-autonomous capability to address key security concerns in the connected home. In this 
paper, we describe the problem, explain specifications for the system, present our work in IoT discovery 
and IoT device classification portions of the system, and show initial results related to our efforts exploring 
novel application of machine learning to build this capability. 
1.3.2 A Capability for Autonomous IoT System Security: Pushing IoT Assurance to the Edge [2] 
Complex systems of IoT devices (SIoTD) are systems that have a single purpose but are composed of 
multiple IoT devices. These systems are becoming ubiquitous; they have complex security requirements 
and face a diverse and ever-changing array of cyber threats. Issues of privacy and bandwidth will preclude 
sending all the data from these systems to a central repository and so these systems cannot totally rely 
on a centralized cloud-based service for their security. The security of these systems must be provided 
locally and in an autonomous fashion. In this paper, we describe a capability to address this problem, 
explain specifications for the system, present our work on SIoTD assurance, and show initial results of a 
novel edge-based application of machine learning to build this capability. 
1.3.3 Envisioning Cybersecurity Analytics for the Internet of Things [6] 
The IoT represents a rethinking of how we currently envision networks. It involves increases in scale 
of an order of magnitude over the next decade, increasingly distributed and virtualized architectures, and 
an ever-changing perimeter. Cybersecurity analytic capability will need to adapt to meet the demands of 
this evolving environment. In this paper, the authors assess the ways in which cybersecurity analytics will 
need to evolve and identify the potential role of government in promoting needed changes. This paper 
provides a brief summary of that effort. 
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1.3.4 Identification of Botnet Activity in IoT Network Traffic Using Machine Learning [5] 
Today our world benefits from IoT technology; however, new security problems arise when these IoT 
devices are introduced into our homes. Because many of these IoT devices have access to the Internet 
and they have little to no security, they make our smart homes highly vulnerable to compromise. Some 
of the threats include IoT botnets and generic confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) attacks. 
Our research explores botnet detection by experimenting with supervised machine learning and deep 
learning classifiers. Furthermore, our approach assesses classifier performance on unbalanced datasets 
that contain benign data, combined with small amounts of malicious data. We demonstrate that the 
classifiers can separate malicious activity from benign activity within a small IoT network dataset. The 
classifiers can also separate malicious activity from benign activity in increasingly larger datasets. Our 
experiments have demonstrated incremental improvement in results for (1) accuracy, (2) probability of 
detection, and (3) probability of false alarm. The best performance results include 99.9% accuracy, 99.8% 
probability of detection, and 0% probability of false alarm. This paper also demonstrates how the 
performance of these classifiers increases as IoT training datasets become increasingly larger. 
1.3.5 A Proposed Trust Model for Assessing Cybersecurity Risk in a Supply Chain Considering IoT ’s 
Impact [3] 
As the IoT becomes increasingly integrated into industrial processes, cyber-attacks to systems using 
their supply chains as points of entry become more common. A decade ago, the Stuxnet virus 
demonstrated the ability to inflict cyber-physical damage on even a closed system via its supply chain. The 
emergence of increased levels of Internet- and IoT-based capabilities—ranging from collaborative design 
capabilities to manufacturing processes that enable fabrication directly from digital models to increased 
use of automation and robotics on factory floor—expands exposure to the Internet and to cyber-attacks. 
Even as awareness of the need to protect against malware implanted in the supply chain grows, there is 
still no effective method of assessing the cyber risk in a supply chain. This paper describes how increased 
integration of IoT-enabled capabilities has expanded the threat surface and proposes a methodology, 
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based on trust metrics and Delphic and analytical hierarchical processes, to identify vulnerabilities in a 
supply chain and better quantify risk. 
1.3.6 Toward an Ambient Computing Paradigm for IoT Cybersecurity: Lowering the Cognitive Load for 
Users [4] 
The IoT is becoming more pervasive in the home, office, hospital, and many other user-facing 
environments (UFEs) as more devices are networked to improve functionality. However, this explosion of 
networked devices in UFEs necessitates that security systems become easier to help users remain aware 
of the security of the devices on their network. Users may not have the skills or the time needed to 
continuously monitor networks of increasing complexity using common open-source tools. Specifically, 
they are not likely to fully comprehend the data that those tools present, nor are they likely to have a 
working knowledge of the tools needed to monitor and protect their IoT-enabled network environments. 
This paper expands earlier work on a CHASM to build a system that uses ambient computing to facilitate 
network security monitoring and administration for the connected home and other UFE-connected 
environments such as hospitals, smart buildings, and smart cities, through novel integration of voice 
assistant technology. Our system is designed to combine machine-learning–enriched device awareness 
and dynamic visualization of IoT networks with a natural language query interface enabled by voice 
assistants to greatly simplify the process of providing awareness of the security state of the network. The 
voice assistant integrates knowledge of devices on the network to communicate status and concerns in a 
manner that is easily understood. These capabilities will help to improve the security of UFEs while 
lowering the associated cognitive load on the users. This paper outlines continued work in progress 
toward building this capability as well as initial results on the efficacy of the system. 
1.4 Outline of this Work 
Each chapter in this dissertation explores an aspect or problem related to security or privacy in IoT. 
• Chapter 2 examines IoT security issues in the home and introduces the CHASM concept. 
• Chapter 3 extends CHASM to the IoT edge. 
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• Chapter 4 examines cybersecurity analytics capability in response to the threats from the 
perspective of a large organizational entity. 
• Chapter 5 examines the use of machine learning to identify botnet activity in IoT devices and 
networks. 
• Chapter 6 introduces and examines a proposed framework for assessing IoT motivated 
cybersecurity risks and its impacts on supply chains. 
• Chapter 7 examines ambient computing and its utility in lowering the cognitive load on users 
when protecting IoT enable networks. 
• Chapter 8 is a summary of the preceding topics explored in this dissertation. 
• Chapter 9 lists the references cited in the research and performance of work described herein. 
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2 CONNECTED HOME AUTOMATED SECURITY MONITOR (CHASM): PROTECTING IOT 
THROUGH APPLICATION OF MACHINE LEARNING 
2.1 Introduction 
Kevin Ashton first used the term Internet of Things (IoT) in 1999 to describe a system in which objects 
in the physical world could be connected to the Internet by sensors [18]. Since the inception of the term, 
estimates predict that by 2020 the total number of Internet-connected devices being used will be 
50 billion [19], and the combined markets of IoT will grow to 520 billion by 2021 [20] into every sector of 
society including the home. 
Along with the convenience, functionality, and entertainment options IoT in the home devices 
introduce, there is a host of related threats. IoT-related compromises are raising the profile of security 
concerns associated with IoT devices [21] [22] [23], but the IoT security market has been unhurried to 
address fundamental security gaps. Security is often applied to hardware, software, and system develop-
ment as an afterthought instead of being included in the initial development process; often, the 
development of IoT devices, platforms, and protocols suffers from a lack of security [24]. The security 
concerns with IoT become more apparent when considering the ubiquitous way in which IoT will be 
integrated into our everyday lives [18] [25]. 
Specifically, one risk of owning home IoT devices is their ability to become invisible to the users over 
time [26]. Once devices become connected to the network, owners tend to forget the device is connected 
and, therefore, do not actively and regularly check them, thereby overlooking the need to perform 
important updates, which exposes the user to security risks. Furthermore, technical diversity in products 
combined with immature standards complicates the task of tracking, securing, and maintaining IoT 
products in the home. 
To complicate things further, rapid change in the device vendor space means manufacturers may 
update a product only for a few years. This directly conflicts with the fact that many smart home 
appliances (e.g., refrigerators) have lifetimes of 10 to 15 years [26]. This creates a case where connected 
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devices may go many years without a software update. This is similar to having an unpatched Windows 
XP service pack 1 device on a current home network today, thereby exposing the network to all of its 
vulnerabilities. 
Compared to the relatively few general-purpose computers (e.g., PCs, smart phones, or tablets) most 
users have to administer in their homes, there could be several dozen IoT devices in a connected home. 
A study of such a home conducted in 2017 showed the average consumer has 13 connected devices [27]. 
With the adoption rate of IoT steadily increasing, that number will continue to rise [28]. With all of these 
IoT devices, the task of keeping a growing IoT network secure places an unrealistic burden on the average 
consumer [29]. In response, the task of protecting IoT-connected domains and applications will need to 
be automated. Therefore, full autonomy likely is not achievable for securing the totality of IoT. We believe 
novel methods will increase the level of autonomy in applications to provide analytically informed insights 
and recommendations, and will support homeowners in their efforts to be more efficient and effective in 
providing assurance for their IoT devices. 
To address these security issues that, to our knowledge, are not currently being fully dealt with by a 
single solution, we propose a framework and solution that combines a novel application of standards-
based detection, behavioral-based detection, verification operation of IoT devices, and application of 
active security measures that address fundamental shortcomings in securing IoT devices in the connected 
home. This approach and capability will help users understand the IoT devices on their networks and to 
maintain the security of those devices. Although this system is intended for the home, the system would 
also be useful to organizations with large numbers of IoT devices. 
Our contributions are as follows: (1) we identify a gap in the IoT home security space and propose a 
system to fill this gap, (2) we experimentally detail the ensemble machine learning model aspect of our 
system, and (3) we introduce early results from the IoT discovery aspect of our system. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces and motivates the 
CHASM system. Section 2.3I introduces IoT discovery and classification efforts for CHASM and discusses 
related works. Section 2.4 presents our experimentation approaches by describing our data collection, 
feature engineering, and model development. Section 2.5 describes our results. Lastly, Section 2.6 
summarizes the paper and discusses future work. 
2.2 CHASM 
CHASM is a proposed IoT security system that aims to reduce the cognitive load on owners in 
managing and securing their connected homes’ environment containing multiple devices, CHASM will 
maintain situational awareness of all of the IoT devices on a home network for the user, monitoring for 
vulnerabilities and detecting threats. Specifically, it will detect devices; monitor rogue, vulnerable, or 
compromised devices; and assist the user in managing the overall complexity of maintaining a safe and 
secure smart home environment addressing the key issues related to securing a connected environment 
[30]. 
The cornerstone capability of this system would be to perform automated device discovery, 
identification, and classification [31] [32] [33] [34]. Through being able to specifically identify and 
characterize all devices on a network, the user would automatically have a list of every IoT device on their 
network, and thus gain insights on what should be addressed on their network from a security point of 
view. 
However, situational awareness of connected devices is not adequate to protect home users [35]. To 
protect a smart home, one needs to have insights into many other aspects of connected devices. Examples 
include how the devices are operating, whether a device is compromised and operating outside its normal 
behavior, and whether the device is properly configured and protected via patches and other updates. 
CHASM also will seek to inform smart home users of the current level of support provided for their device 
from the manufacturer. 
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2.2.1 CHASM Capabilities and Requirements 
To meet the needs previously outlined, CHASM will provide the following functional capabilities for 
connected home users to better protect themselves: 
• Perform automated IoT device discovery. 
• Keep a tally of devices connected to a network (based on devices discovered). 
– Warn when new devices are connected. 
– Perform IoT device profiling and verification. 
• Verify devices are operating as they should. 
– Detect for attacks against devices. 
– Determine whether a device is operating outside its intended range. 
• Help users keep their devices properly patched and secured. 
– Provide device and device software patch support. 
– Notify users when the last update was made available. 
– Warn users of possible unsupported devices based on changes in the manufacturer or the 
company, or for issues specific to a device (e.g., no longer supported with patches). 
– Warn users if there are known vulnerabilities in a device. 
– Recommend and remind users to change default passwords and show the last time they were 
changed. 
Considering CHASM’s target capabilities and long-term goal to run on the edge in a user’s 
environment, requirements for machine-learning algorithms deployed to the system are as follows: 
• They can be deployed on a lightweight, affordable processing platform. 
• They do not require total session knowledge for classifications. 
• They strive to use the most computationally efficient method to meet a goal. 
• They create portable models, selecting features that work across multiple different networks. 
15 
• They can provide insights on devices for which they were not trained. If CHASM cannot classify a 
specific device, it will classify the type of device through its characteristics and relationships to 
other similar devices. 
2.3 IoT Device Discovery and Classification 
This chapter describes initial work done to develop the device discovery and classification capability 
of CHASM. Future work will explore anomaly detection and patch support capabilities. We focus initial 
attention to the IoT discovery processes because we believe features important for IoT device discovery 
will be reusable for device profiling and threat analysis model development tasks. Furthermore, we 
believe IoT discovery is foundational because a user needs to have a good accounting and understanding 
of the devices on a network to be able to protect and secure them. 
Although there are many ways to perform IoT discovery, each has its strengths and limitations. For 
example, with Media Access Control (MAC) addresses, one can determine the device manufacturer. This 
approach is relatively straightforward, but it also can be spoofed or be representative of another device 
in the network chain (e.g., a router or a switch) [36]. Another method to perform direct IoT device 
discovery is to investigate full TCP sessions; however, this requires waiting until the end of a session to 
extract the necessary features. In addition, for some IoT devices, the TCP sessions can last for days [31]. 
For this reason, the focus of this work is to explore discovery, profiling, and verification of IoT devices 
solely based on their network behavior or other information contained in individual or constrained groups 
of packets. The goal is to combine aspects from multiple IoT discovery approaches in an ensemble analytic 
that fuses insights from each approach. 
Outlined next are relevant related efforts from the literature in IoT discovery and classifications that 
were used for motivations in our work. 
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2.3.1 Related Work in Behavioral-based IoT Device Discovery 
Zhang et al. [32] used passive traffic measures for their research centered on the Samsung 
SmartThings platform. The authors evaluated 181 SmartThings devices by leveraging side-channel 
inference capabilities to design and develop a system to monitor SmartApps from encrypted wireless 
traffic. 
Luo et al. [33] developed an automated system that can characterize an IoT device and generate an 
automated profile. They used a set of observable traits that comprise an IoT device, including protocols 
being used, data transfer rate, heartbeat frequency, upload and download rate, and the number of global 
or public traffic packets. 
Shahid et al. [31] present a machine-learning–based approach to recognize the type of IoT devices 
connected to the network by analyzing streams of packets sent and received. Their results are promising, 
with an overall accuracy as high as 99.9% on their test set achieved by a random forest classifier. 
Meidan et al. [34] used random forest applied to features extracted from network traffic data with 
the goal of accurately identifying IoT device types from the white list. IoT devices were correctly detected 
as unknown in 96% of test cases (on average), and white-listed device types were correctly classified by 
their actual types in 99% of cases. 
Leung et al. [37] used protocol-independent network flows characteristics to compare a number of 
IoT discovery research efforts, summarized the results, and created an ensemble algorithm that leveraged 
the features invented by previous efforts from Shen et al. [38] and Pego and Nunes [36]. They then 
combined them using a random forest classification algorithm. 
The results of these related works and others indicate there is potential for a lightweight security 
application that runs in the background and is capable of performing automated device identification. 
Using a similar approach to the one proposed by Meidan et al. and Leung et al., we extend their work on 
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behavioral-based device discovery to include behavioral-based verification of devices to ensure they are 
operating normally [39] and behavioral-based detection of attacks against the device [40]. 
2.4 Experimentation 
2.4.1 Data Collection 
Our data set consisted of 2 months of network data collected from 16 IoT devices on an Internet-
connected network. The devices were part of a larger collection of 120 connected devices including 
tablets, smart phones, and other IoT devices (e.g., thermostats, smart speakers, and smart outlets). The 
devices were configured and operated normally by users during the 2-month period. The network data 
were captured using WireShark on a PC on the IoT network. The resulting captured data were segmented 
into 1-hour blocks of packet capture (PCAP) data and saved to a file. Each 1-hour block contained 
heterogeneous captures of the various IoT devices performing their normal operations. The collection of 
1-hour PCAP files was then stored in the internal network to support machine-learning exploration. 
Figure 2-1 shows the architecture for our testbed setup. Figure 2-2 shows the devices and their data 
activity patterns. Table 2-1 lists the specific devices under test. 
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Figure 2-1 IoT Testbed High-Level Architecture 
 
Figure 2-2 Select Device Activity Time Range per Device 
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Table 2-1 IoT Devices Under Test 
Device ID Device 
0c:47:c9:10:d4:6f Amazon Echo v1 
18:b4:30:1f:17:19 Nest Protect 
18:b4:30:e4:83:a2 Nest Camera #1 
18:b4:30:e4:c6:2d Nest Camera #2 
2c:61:f6:75:0a:72 Apple iPad 
48:d6:d5:79:37:85 Google Home #1 
48:d6:d5:98:71:cb Google Home #2 
4c:ef:c0:07:94:8e Amazon Echo v2 
54:c9:df:8e:88:3f LaMertic Clock 
ac:cf:23:65:e5:e4 Orvibo Outlet 
b0:c5:54:0f:4a:44 D-Link Day/Night Cloud Camera 
b4:75:0e:0c:a9:61 WeMo Switch 
b4:79:a7:24:38:1a Wink Hub 
b8:e9:37:57:30:be Sonos Speaker 
c0:56:27:54:28:91 Belkin NetCam HD+ 
d4:90:9c:d5:e1:48 Apple Home Pod 
0c:47:c9:10:d4:6f Amazon Echo v1 
 
2.4.2 Feature Selection and Engineering 
Through examining the related works, we identified a combined list of potential single-packet, 
nonweighted features and multipacket features for machine-learning algorithm development for IoT. We 
considered a number of factors in identifying potential features to extract from each packet in the PCAP 
data. Table 2-2, which references Bezawada et al. [41] and Miettinen et al. [42], outlines the single-packet 
feature set. 
Meidan et al. [34] followed each TCP session from each device from successful SYN→FIN, and then 
extracted more than 300 features from each session. The following are the most important and useful of 
these features: 
• Time-to-live for TCP packets sent from device to server: minimum, maximum, average, first 
quartile, and third quartile 
• Total number of packets in the session that contain the Reset flag 
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• Ratio between number of bytes sent from device and received by device 
Shahid et al. [31] grouped TCP flows by unique combinations of source and destination IP and port. 
For each conversation, they extracted the following: 
• The size of the first N packets sent 
• The size of the first N packets received 
• The N – 1 packet inter-arrival times between the first N packets sent 
• The N – 1 packet inter-arrival times between the first N packets received 
Using combinations of these techniques, along with analytic insights motivated from Buczak et al., we 
enhance and extend the multipacket features by applying the following statistical transforms: average, 
variance, skewness, and kurtosis [43]. 
2.4.3 Model Selection and Model Development 
Leveraging the Anaconda Data science distribution [44], we used Python pandas in a Jupyter notebook 
to form test data sets that comprised a sub-collection of the IoT devices. Ground truth was already 
established for the data set in that we knew a priori the mapping between a specific IoT device and its 
associated MAC address and associated IP addresses. We created models using Python Scikit-learn 
libraries and applied our data to these models. 
2.4.3.1 Multiclass Decision Forest Details 
The first machine learning model explored was a multiclass decision forest [45] classifier. This machine 
learning method uses decision trees and bagging to predict a target that has multiple values. The random 
forest [46] is composed of multiple decision trees, and the final answer is decided by majority voting based 
on the predictions. This produces models that are robust despite noise and have error rates that are 
similar to neural networks. We chose this model based on its proven performance exhibited in the related 
works. We trained the multiclass decision forest classifier to distinguish the type of IoT device presented 
to the classifier. 
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2.4.3.2 Multiclass Neural Network Details 
The second machine learning model explored was a multiclass neural network [47]. This is a variation 
of a Deep Neural Network that can predict a single target from a collection of multiple candidates. A neural 
network is a set of interconnected layers, where the inputs are the first layer and are connected to an 
output layer by an acyclic graph composed of weighted edges and nodes. Between the input and output 
layers are hidden layers. The number of hidden layers can be configured to optimize performance based 
on the type of classification being performed. In our experiments, we created a single hidden layer where 
the output layer was fully connected to the input layers, and the number of nodes in the hidden layer was 
set to 100. We selected this classifier to attempt to leverage the time series nature of the IoT data. 
2.5 Results 
The initial machine-learning model results were varied for our initial data set. 
2.5.1 Multiclass Decision Forest 
Using the single-packet features, the multiclass decision forest posted an overall accuracy of over 98% 
and an average accuracy of 99%. Comparing these results, this model matched or bested previous efforts 
cited in related works, and it verifies that the decision forest is a good choice and performs well for the 
purpose of IoT discovery. The total model results are shown in Table 2-3. The top six features (those with 
information gain values above 0.01) for the multiclass decision forest are tcp_payload_entropy, 
tcp_src_port, tcp_window_size, ip_ttl, and TLSv1.2, and tcp_len (Figure 2-3). 
Table 2-2 Select Features Used for Device Discovery and Classification – Machine Learning Model 
Development 
Name Example and Description Reference 
Network Layer Protocol IP, ICMP, ICMPv6, EAPoL [41] 
Transport Layer Protocol TCP, UDP, etc. [41] 
Application Layer Protocol HTTP, HTTPS, DHCP, BOOTP, SSDP, DNS, MDNS, NTP, etc. [41] 
Internet Protocol (IP) options Padding, RouterAlert [41] 
Packet Length Integer number [48] 
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Name Example and Description Reference 
TCP: source port class 
An integer from 0 to 3 
no port ⇒ f = 0 
well-known port [0, 1023] ⇒ f = 1 
registered port [1024, 49151] ⇒ f = 2 
dynamic port [49152, 65535] ⇒ f = 3 
[42 
TCP: destination port class Same as source port class [42] 
TCP: payload length Integer number [41] 
TCP: Shannon Entropy of payload Used to determine whether a file is encrypted [41] 
TCP: window size Length of the TCP receive window [36] 
UDP: source port class Similar to TPC source port class for User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [34] 
UDP: payload length Length of the UDP payload [34]] 
UDP: Shannon Entropy of payload Used to determine whether a file is encrypted [32] 
Timestamp Unix epoch time (in milliseconds) [37] 
Aggregated into sequences of five 
packets 
For each five-packet sequence, all single-packet features were 
concatenated and scored. 
[48]] 
Aggregated packets into flow 
summaries  
For each flow summary, extracted: sleep time, active volume, 
average packet size, mean rate, peak-to-mean ratio, active time, 
number of servers, number of protocols, unique DNS requests, 
DNS interval, NTP interval, and most frequent port number. 
[38] 
 
Table 2-3 Multiclass Decision Forest Results 
Overall accuracy 0.982324 
Average accuracy 0.991162 
Micro-averaged precision 0.982324 
Macro-averaged precision 0.979172 
Micro-averaged recall 0.982324 




Figure 2-3 Information Gain for Non-Zero Features Multiclass Decision Forest 
2.5.2 Multiclass Neural Network 
The multiclass neural network had an overall accuracy of 83% and an average accuracy of 91%. 
Analyzing these results, one sees there was a great deal of variability in this model’s performance. 
Specifically, the model precision (i.e., percentage of results that are relevant) and the model recall (i.e., 
percentage of total relevant results correctly classified by the algorithm) dropped to 83%, as shown in 
Table 2-4. The top seven features (those with information gain values above 0.01) for the multiclass neural 
network are TLSv1.0, Unknown TCP, tcp_payload_entropy, tcp_src_port, ip_ttl, UDP, and TLSv1.2 
(Figure 2-4) 
Table 2-4 Multiclass Neural Network Results 
Overall accuracy 0.832727 
Average accuracy 0.916363 
Micro-averaged precision 0.832727 
Macro-averaged precision 0.862141 
Micro-averaged recall 0.832727 




Figure 2-4 Information Gain for Non-Zero Features Multiclass Neural Network 
Another source of variability in the results was due to the wide variety in how IoT traffic presents itself 
based on operating modes. IoT traffic has significantly different characteristics in an active state versus a 
quiescent state. The takeaway is that as we train machine-learning models on these data, one will need 
to take into account the variable nature of IoT traffic and train over a broader temporal collection of data 




Figure 2-5 IoT Data Characterization Variance (Active vs. Quiescent State) 
2.5.3 Ensemble Analytics 
Using a collection of different discovery approaches, we created an ensemble analytic that combines 
multiple discovery analytics into a single score. The ensemble analytic (Figure 2-6) includes: 
• Translating device MAC address to manufacturer name 
• Quick category classifier (determine IoT device category after 20 packets) 
• Slower category classifier (determine category after 10K packets) 
• Device classifier (identify specific types devices) 
Each approach for discovery provided a view or perspective into the device that can be combined to 
improve the overall confidence of individual model results. Furthermore, any impedance mismatch or 
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changes between modes can be used as a general anomy detector for devices. We will develop and 
explore this concept for improved device detection, classification, and anomaly detection in future work. 
 
Figure 2-6 Example of IoT Discovery Ensemble Analytic 
2.6 Future Work 
Future work will further define the CHASM concept and build a reference implementation. We will 
develop machine-learning models to characterize normal behaviors and detect abnormal behavior for 
identified IoT devices. We will design an alerting capability that mines open-source data to assist users in 
keeping their devices properly patched and secured and warn them of issues specific to a device, or which 
devices are now possibly unsupported based on changes in the manufacturer or the company. 
Additionally we will explore leveraging a larger set of the features and explore ensembles of individual 
machine-learning models to try to improve the performance on the IoT discovery models. 
In conducting this research, we have captured and characterized over 250 GB of IoT data containing 
dozens of different devices. We believe this dataset would be of value to the broader academic 
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community and plan its release to support further research by the academic community at the completion 
of our research. 
Beyond its value for the connected home, we believe CHASM could have direct application to large 
constantly evolving IoT environments such as in clinical and hospital settings where devices are added and 
removed from the network frequently, providing entire classes of devices that could be added to the 
network and forgotten. CHASM could provide monitoring and security capabilities for hospital 
information technology (IT) administrators to better protect their networks, patients, and data. We also 
believe CHASM could have utility in industrial control settings, where administrators need to maintain 
strict control over what devices are connected to their networks. We are actively researching how CHASM 
can be tailored and tuned for these environments. 
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3 A CAPABILITY FOR AUTONOMOUS IOT SYSTEM SECURITY: PUSHING IOT ASSURANCE TO 
THE EDGE 
3.1 Introduction 
Complex SIoTD are systems that have a single purpose, but are made up of multiple IoT devices. These 
systems are generally comprised of many individual IoT devices working together to form a larger, 
cohesive system function. SIoTDs are becoming commonplace as IoT devices proliferate into our society 
(e.g., our homes, smart cars, smart offices, smart buildings, smart hospitals, and smart cities). These 
systems often have complex security requirements and face a diverse and ever-changing array of cyber 
threats. Devices may come and go from these systems at any time, and some systems may only be 
intermittently connected to central processing hubs (clouds). An impending increase in data transmission 
rates (5G) and constantly changing network footprints will further complicate the network defender’s job 
of maintaining situational awareness and providing security for these systems. 
In addition to these challenges, many SIoTD networks are segmented, meaning that the data from all 
devices might not be sent back to a single place. Thus, these systems cannot rely on a centralized cloud-
based service for their security. Rather, protection for these systems must occur locally and in an 
autonomous or semi-autonomous fashion. 
To obtain a complete picture of an SIoTD, and to meet the security and related analytic requirements, 
processing will need to occur close to the point of data generation. This region is known as the edge. 
(Figure 3-1, derived from [49]). 
There are three data-focused use cases related to SIoTD that motivate pushing IoT situational 
awareness and system security to the edge: 
IoT applications will generate too much localized data, making it impractical to ship all data back to a 
central location. 
Data privacy concerns from the system owner will restrict sensitive data from being stored in a public 
cloud. System owners will want to maintain control of their personal, valuable data. 
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Many IoT use cases have stringent timing requirements that cannot tolerate extensive latencies based 
on round trip timing from the point of data generation to the cloud and back. These cases require data to 
be processed and intelligence generated locally. 
This chapter describes ongoing work exploring novel techniques to build a capability providing 
real-time, edge-centric, automated situational awareness and assurance to IoT networks. 
Our contributions are as follows: (1) we identify a gap in the security of SIoTD and propose a solution 
to fill this gap, (2) we experimentally detail the machine learning (ML) pipeline and corresponding model 
development, and (3) we introduce results of porting the assurance algorithms from a server to a low size, 
weight, and power (SWaP) device running autonomously at the edge collocated at the point of data 
generation. 
 
Figure 3-1 IoT Edge Computing 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1.1 provides an overview of the 
automation types guiding this capability. Section 3.1.2 discusses related works. Section 3.1.3 outlines the 
IoT assurance architecture. Section 3.1.4 describes the feature selection, engineering, and generation 
activities. Section 3.1.5 presents the IoT data pipeline and the associated design. Section 3.1.6 presents 
an overview of model selection and training. Section 3.1.7 describes the results. Lastly, Section 3.1.8 
presents the conclusions and discusses future work. 
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3.1.1 Automation Types 
Artificial intelligence (AI) initiatives can be broadly categorized according to their goals [50]. Two of 
the most common are: 
• Process automation 
– Automation of digital and physical tasks using “robotic (physical or virtual via computer code)” 
process automation technologies. 
• Cognitive insight 
– Using algorithms to detect patterns in vast volumes of data and interpret their meaning 
To meet the needs of this system, we will employ elements of both process automation and cognitive 
insights. This capability will operate in a semi-autonomous fashion, acting as an agent or virtual robot and 
is made up of a collection of related hardware, frameworks, algorithms and edge devices. This capability 
will essentially be an autonomous realization of CHASM for SIoTD [1].  
3.1.2 Related Works 
A literature survey was conducted to gather a list of relevant features and techniques that might be 
useful for fingerprinting/profiling IoT devices. 
Meidan et al. [51] extracted features from TCP sessions and trained a multiclass random forest 
classifier to identify IoT devices from a white list and distinguish between known and unknown devices. 
Shahid et al. [52] presented an ML-based approach to identify IoT devices by analyzing streams of 
packets sent and received with an overall accuracy as high as 99.9% on their tests et using random forest 
classifiers. 
Truong et al. [53] used a recurrent neural network to identify and classify IoT devices in network 
traffic. 
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Buczak et al. [43] used random forest augmented with the statistical moment of average, variance, 
skewness, and kurtosis to develop an ensemble algorithm to identify the presence of covert DNS tunnels 
in network traffic. 
Sivanathan et al. [54] used random forest in a smart-campus environment instrumented with a 
diversity of IoT devices over a 3-week period to distinguish IoT devices from non-IoT devices and to classify 
IoT device with 95% accuracy. 
Bai et al. [55] employed a long short-term memory (LSTM) convolutional neural network (CNN) 
cascade model to automatically identify the semantic type of a device to achieve automatic device 
classification in network traffic streams of IoT devices. 
Bezawada et al. [56] extracted a wide range of features from packet headers to build device 
fingerprint vectors, and used Gradient Boosting classify IoT devices. 
The features selected for implementation are listed in Table 3-1. 
3.1.3 IoT Assurance Architecture 
Our goal in this effort is to train models that can autonomously identify IoT device types. We want 
those models to perform well in both a controlled laboratory setting and the real world. Therefore, it is 
essential that we train the models on datasets that include large numbers of IoT devices with large 
amounts of traffic from each. It is assumed that in the case of device classification (i.e., guessing what 
category a device belongs to), it would also be best to have many different devices in each category so 
that the model does not overfit to the behavior of a few devices. 
An IoT testbed was assembled containing 56 IoT devices of various types. The IoT devices were 
installed on a network demilitarized zone (DMZ), also referred to as an isolated perimeter network, that 
had access to the Internet. This is because the devices were untrusted but needed Internet access to 
function properly. We used a span port on a switch to send all network traffic to a Jetson Nano, which ran 
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tcpdump and archived the data in PCAP format. That data was then transferred to a local, on-premises 
“cloud” server outside the DMZ to be used as training data for the models. 
Table 3-1 Features Used for Fingerprinting and Profiling IoT Devices 
Feature Name Description Reference 
Packet Length Integer, range 0 to 65535, but typically 0 to 1500  
Ethernet Protocol IPv4/IPv6/ARP/LLDP/EAPoL/Unknown [56] 
IP Protocol ICMP/TCP/UDP/ICMPv6/Unknown [56] 
IP Time-to-Live (TTL) Integer, range 0 to 255  
TCP Application Protocol HTTP/SSHv2/SSLv3.0/TLSv1.0/TLSv1.1/TLSv1.2/Unknown [56] 
UDP Application Protocol SSDP/DNS/MDNS/NTP/DHCP/ISAKMP/Unknown [56] 
TCP/UDP Source Port Class Each value has its own column, with a 0 or 1 value 
SYSTEM= port 1-1023 
USER= port 1024-49151 
DYNAMIC= port 49152-65535 
UNKNOWN= port > 65535 
[57] 
TCP/UDP Destination Port Class Each value has its own column, with a 0 or 1 value 
SYSTEM= port 1-1023 
USER= port 1024-49151 
DYNAMIC= port 49152-65535 
UNKNOWN= port > 65535 
[57] 
TCP: payload length Integer, range 0 to 65535 [56] 
TCP: Shannon Entropy of payload Float, range 0.0 to 8.0 [56] 
TCP: window size Integer, range 0 to 65535 [56] 
UDP: payload length Integer, range 0 to 65535  
UDP: Shannon Entropy of payload Float, range 0.0 to 8.0  
From Internet Integer, 0 or 1 
Set to 1 if the packet is coming from a public IP address 
 
To Internet Integer, 0 or 1 
Set to 1 if the packet is being sent to a public IP address 
 
 
3.1.4 Feature Selection, Engineering and Generation 
When determining what features to extract from network packet data, it is important to keep in mind 
that many IoT devices are already using encryption methods such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) to 
secure their traffic against eavesdropping and that more devices will be using this type of security in the 
future. Therefore, it would be naïve to assume that features extracted from unencrypted packet payload 
data will remain useful in the future. Rather, the selected features should be those that can be easily 
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extracted from both encrypted and non-encrypted traffic. For example, features extracted from packet 
headers such as packet length, IP time-to-live, TCP window size, and payload entropy can be extracted 
from packets regardless of whether the payload is encrypted or not. 
Furthermore, any features used for IoT discovery might be useful for IoT profiling, threat detection, 
and anomaly detection as well (future work). 
3.1.5 Data Pipeline Design 
A successful edge deployment involves more than simply pushing a trained model out to an edge 
device to be executed. The feature extraction code and other data processing logic that are part of the 
associated analytic pipeline must also be ported to run at the edge. This is because those processing 
components transform the raw sensor data into a form that is ready for ML processing. Thus, any feature 
extraction or data processing code that is part of the analytics pipeline must be designed in such a way 
that it can either be massively parallelized in a central data center for training purposes or pushed to the 
edge to run on a less capable computing platform. It is an added productivity bonus if the code can run in 
the same form on both types of platforms without modification, thus streamlining the deployment 
process. 
With this in mind, the feature extraction and processing pipeline for this system was designed to be 
portable from the ground up (Figure 3-2), making the deployment of the complete analytics processing 
pipeline to the edge straightforward. We implemented the feature extraction in C++ on top of the open-
source libtins library [58], which provides efficient methods for collecting and parsing network packet 
data. Higher layers of the software that aggregate the packet data by device and transform the data into 
vectors that are ready for ML were written in Python using a combination of scikit-learn, pandas, and 
custom Python code. Keras and TensorFlow were used for model training and inference. 
These software modules were combined into a reusable Python package named iot-ai, which allows 
the user to create modular data pipelines for subsequent ML development. Since model training is a batch 
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operation and model execution on a real-world network is ideally a streaming operation, the iot-ai library 
was designed to be a streaming capability. Batch operations are handled as streaming ones by streaming 
individual lines of a static file through the pipeline. This limits the system complexity by unifying two very 
similar processing pathways and code bases into one. With this design, no code conversion is needed 
when porting a feature extraction pipeline from batch mode in the cloud (for training) to streaming mode 
at the edge (for live inference). 
The nodes in the pipeline have flexible interfaces and can be combined in different ways to facilitate 
the many operations typically involved in training an ML model on network data. Furthermore, individual 
pipeline nodes can be parallelized to take advantage of multi-core CPUs when available. 
 
Figure 3-2 IoT Feature Extraction and Processing Pipeline 
Additionally, the libtins library provides the option of reading packets from a PCAP file or reading the 
packets directly from a network interface, which means our pipeline can be easily transitioned from 
processing static data to running on live data. 
The result is a modular pipeline design that can be easily reused for data collection at the edge, 
training in the cloud, execution of models in the cloud, and execution of models at the edge. 
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3.1.6 Model Selection and Training 
The chosen model architecture was a recurrent neural network consisting of a single LSTM single layer 
of 128 units, followed by softmax output of width 10 (one for each category of device). The LSTM layer 
was fed with fixed-length input sequences of 20 feature vectors, one vector per network packet. 
The model was trained on PCAP data that was collected from the IoT testbed over the course of 
3 months (Figure 3-3). This included data from 56 different IoT devices and amounted to 94 GB of PCAP 
(about 262M packets). This dataset was then split into 80% for training, 19% for validation during training, 
and a 1% holdout for final evaluation of model performance. 
 
Figure 3-3 Collection, Extraction, Training, and Testing Pipeline 
Traffic from each IoT device was grouped by MAC address and arranged in time order. The data from 
each device was then transformed into sequences of 20 packets each. The values in these sequences were 
then normalized, one-hot-encoded and labeled according to device category (e.g., this 20-packet 
sequence is from a camera, this other 20-packet sequence is from a thermostat, etc.). 
3.1.7 Results 
The initial ML model results were varied for our initial data set. However, the observed variation was 
in execution speed, not accuracy. 
3.1.7.1 Model Execution and Results (On the Server) 
The model was trained successfully on a single Nvidia Tesla V100 GPU in under 1 hour, and achieved 
93% accuracy on each of the training, validation, and holdout datasets. The model’s detailed performance 
results on the holdout set for each category are presented in Table 3-2. 
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Table 3-2 Model Performance Results on Holdout Set per Category 
Category Precision Recall F1-Score Support 
Unknown 0.98 0.95 0.96 10893 
assistant 0.98 0.85 0.91 19765 
audio device 0.95 0.93 0.94 1307 
clocks 1.00 0.81 0.89 3437 
hub 0.76 1.00 0.86 22254 
mobile device 0.78 0.66 0.71 397 
router 1.00 0.89 0.94 17382 
television 0.98 0.96 0.97 44895 
thermostat 1.00 1.00 1.00 5241 
triggers and switches 1.00 0.97 0.98 5463 
 
At the time of this writing, the amount of traffic being generated by the IoT devices in the testbed is 
relatively small (20 MB every 10 minutes). With a parallelization level of 3×, the end-to-end data pipeline 
including the trained model can process the aforementioned 10 minutes of network data in 47 seconds 
on a large virtual machine (VM) server with 30 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPUs at 2.50 GHz and 512 GB of random 
access memory (RAM). In this configuration, the processing pipeline consumed only 6 CPUs and 3 GB of 
RAM. 
3.1.7.2 Port to Low-SWaP Devices 
To execute the model at the edge, a Raspberry Pi 3B was obtained, having a four-core, 1.2-GHz 
Broadcom, 64-bit ARMv7 CPU and 1 GB of RAM. Tensorflow2 was installed, followed by the iot-ai library 
and its dependencies (libtins, libpcap, etc.). This device was then connected to the same network as the 
IoT devices, and a span port was set up on the network switch to forward all the network traffic from each 
device to the Raspberry Pi (Figure 3-4). 
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Figure 3-4 Cloud-to-Edge Analytic Extraction Configuration 
3.1.7.3 Results of Model at Edge 
On the edge platform, the data pipeline was able to process 10 minutes of testbed traffic in 6 minutes. 
While this is encouraging and indicates that the edge device is currently capable of keeping up with the 
live stream of testbed data, this data volume is still somewhat small. 
The speed of pipeline execution at the edge could likely be improved by running the model on an 
ML-focused edge device such as an Nvidia Jetson TX2 or by converting the model to TensorFlow Lite, 
which Google claims will soon offer support for LSTM networks with fixed sequence lengths [59]. 
3.1.8 Conclusions and Future Work 
These results indicate that it is possible to run IoT device discovery, classification, and verification 
models at the edge on low-SWaP devices; however, we feel there are areas of improvement that can be 
explored to increase the performance of the system. 
3.1.8.1 Model Tuning 
We did not perform extensive hyper-parameter tuning, actively exercise the individual IoT devices to 
collect traffic during all phases of device operation, nor normalize the number of training examples from 
each device category. This could be explored in future work. 
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3.1.8.2 Complex Network Topologies 
The network topology used in this effort was a relatively straightforward one; all devices were 
connected to the same router, and the network traffic was captured at that router. In future work, we 
intend to apply the concepts and systems developed in this effort to more complex network topologies. 
3.1.8.3 Model Training at the Edge 
We believe that, over time, advances in low-SWaP devices will allow for model training at the edge, 
running alongside model execution. We will explore this in future work. 
3.1.8.4 Analytic Ensembles 
The IoT landscape is complex and evolving; new devices are appearing all the time. Therefore, training 
a single model for IoT discovery would be problematic, as there would be a constant need to retrain that 
model as new types of devices are produced (often). 
Two additional challenges for the single-model approach are the inherent trade-offs between 
generating results quickly and observing devices long enough to make good predictions, and the fact that 
individual models may be biased, brittle, or prone to error in certain situations. 
Combining multiple models into an ensemble may help in this regard. If some models are noisy or 
inaccurate due to a rapidly changing device landscape, they can be balanced out by others. For example, 
if four models say a given device is a camera and one says something else, it is probably a camera. 
Using an ensemble approach would also allow some models to focus on quick but less accurate 
predictions and others on much slower but more accurate predictions. This way, the user would receive 
a notification almost immediately, and the result would be refined over time. Allowing the user to drill 
down and see the results from individual models would provide an additional degree of explanation in 
these situations. 
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Other findings of this work include the following: 
• The same analytics that were designed for IoT Device Discovery also could be used for IoT Device 
Verification and Threat Detection. 
– Example 1: All ensemble analytics agree that device X is a camera, but all of a sudden, half of 
them are now claiming it is a thermostat. 
▪ Perhaps the device has begun behaving differently (may indicate a potential compromise) 
▪ OR this indicates an issue with the models 
– Example 2: None of the ensemble analytics agree on device X. 
▪ Perhaps this is a new type of device not seen before, and further investigation will be 
needed 
We believe these results indicate that a distributed, edge-based, semi-autonomous capability could 
be developed and deployed in complex, dynamic SIoTD environments, and the associated model may be 
able to maintain good performance, even if the model is presented with data on which is has not been 
trained. We will explore this in future work. 
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4 ENVISIONING CYBERSECURITY ANALYTICS FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
The IoT is large; it is ubiquitous; and it is growing. Although it is likely not possible to place a definitive 
number on the size of the IoT, estimates of its current size range in the tens of billions, and it is expected 
to increase in size by an order of magnitude by the end of the next decade [16]. The IoT will be an integral 
part of every sector of the U.S. economy and will substantially influence daily activities ranging from 
healthcare to transportation to provision of basic services. “Smart” grids, with automated sensors and 
control systems to achieve improved efficiency, will be integrated into transportation and public utility 
systems. Industrial processes will become dependent on automation and robotics, affecting the 
manufacturing, chemical, and defense sectors. Financial and legal institutions housing vast amounts of 
sensitive data will be equipped with IoT-enabled sensors and controls, including security surveillance 
systems. Public health and emergency services will be connected to biometric and geolocation sensors to 
provide continuous monitoring of patient and first responder status. 
However, the IoT is more than the connection of an increasing number of smart devices. It is a 
consequence and a driver of an evolution in computer and communications technology that will radically 
alter the way machines and humans communicate and interact. The IoT is enabled by technological 
innovation, and it is having a profound effect on the development of new capabilities. As envisioned, the 
emerging IoT would be impossible without increased bandwidth; new decentralized network topologies; 
compact, low-power “intelligent” devices that connect to networks; and the virtualization of networks 
and network functions. In turn, the demands of the IoT for increased scale and for customized applications 
with higher reliability and lower latency to support increasing levels of computation, automation, derived 
intelligence, and robotics is a driver of new technologies. 
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With the capability, scale, and complexity of the emerging IoT comes vulnerability to cyber-attack. As 
network traffic increases in both scale and complexity, cybersecurity analysts will require new tools to 
enable rapid interpretation and response to a new, expanding set of cybersecurity threats. 
This chapter summarizes the results of an 8-month analysis of large-scale networks in support of the 
National Critical Function (NCF) set [60]. An analysis was performed to evaluate the impact of the IoT and 
associated technologies on existing cybersecurity analytics tools and capabilities. The goal of this analysis 
was to define a vision to guide the evolution of cybersecurity analytics, and to define a governmental role 
in promoting that vision. It was envisioned that government’s primary focus would be on protecting public 
sector networks, but, as a result of the interconnectedness of the emerging IoT, there was also desire to 
define a role in promoting a more secure IoT for the private sector. 
The contributions of this chapter are as follows: (1) we define an IoT taxonomy supporting the NCF; 
(2) we identify several trends that could create novel and/or heightened cybersecurity risk; (3) we define 
the role of government in developing IoT scale cybersecurity analytics; and (4) we propose recommenda-
tions based on key IoT cybersecurity vision elements that will guide organizations to realize the necessary 
level of capability to secure the IoT. 
This remainder of this chapter is divided as follows. Section 4.2 describes the IoT, the enabling 
technologies that enable it, and the cybersecurity approaches affected by it. Section 4.3 lays out a vision 
for an emerging IoT cybersecurity analytics capability. Section 4.4 attempts to define a potential role for 
government in making this vision a reality. Lastly, Section 4.5 presents conclusions. 
4.2 IoT Taxonomy 
There is no consensus definition for what constitutes the IoT. Organizations including NIST, Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and International Telecommunications Union have put 
forward their own definitions or descriptions that are both roughly the same and slightly different [10] 
[14] [15]. Nonetheless, there is agreement that the IoT consists of an increasingly large number of 
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machines exchanging data across interconnected networks. Connected machines provide varying levels 
of processing capacity (i.e., intelligence) and perform a wide range of tasks. Devices connected to the IoT 
can act as sensors and actuators supporting relatively simple automated tasks, or they can be complex 
intelligent agents functioning as part of autonomous or robotic systems. They can be connected to 
networks using IPs (i.e., devices connected directly to the Internet or via later-generation mobile 
networks), or they can connect via gateway technologies or other non-IP communications protocols. 
IoT-enabling technologies can be divided into four categories [61]: 
• Devices 
• Networks and computing 
• Communications 
• Software 
The past decade has seen a steady rise in the number of personal devices (e.g., phones, tablets, and 
laptops) connected to the Internet. Today, a majority of citizens in the United States owns a smart phone, 
providing them access to a camera, a capable processor, and the Internet via one readily portable, 
lightweight device. [62]. In addition, advances in processor manufacturing have enabled integration of 
small processors in a wide range of household devices. The ability to provide significant processing in small 
devices with limited energy consumption is leading to increasing automation of everything from everyday 
household appliances to advanced industrial control systems. Networks are populated by personal 
communication and computing devices as well as a broad range of smaller sensors, actuators, and control 
systems providing remote control over a variety of processes. 
The rise in IoT has been abetted by and influenced an evolution in network architecture. Increased 
automation, autonomy, and robotics have led to more network traffic and a need for reduced latency and 
higher reliability. To reduce network traffic and latency, while increasing reliability, there has been a move 
from centralized “cloud” computing structures to more decentralized “fog” and “mist” computing 
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structures. Fog and mist computing enable critical computing capabilities, including analytics, to move 
toward the “edge” of the architecture to various locations capable of supporting analytics and levels of 
decision-making, as well as into the IoT devices themselves. Additionally, the demands of the varied IoT 
applications will in the future be met by enhanced use of virtualization. Virtualization, in the form of 
software-defined networks and virtualization of network functions, is already making networks more 
responsive and flexible. The advent of network virtualization will make it possible to operate networks 
within networks (i.e., network slicing). Virtual networks, all operating within a single physical space, will 
be capable of meeting the customized needs of specific applications or network segments. 
A third area of technological change is communications. Just as the IoT is a product of increased 
communications connectivity and bandwidth, the envisioned future of the IoT will also depend on greater 
bandwidth and the ability of connected devices to operate with low power consumption. Implementation 
of the 5G telecommunications standard will enable wireless devices to operate at higher frequencies, 
where bandwidth is less constrained. In addition, the 5G standard will support direct device-to-device 
(D2D) communications connectivity, enabling devices to connect directly to other devices without the 
need to access intervening service provider infrastructure. Implementation of D2D will enable ad hoc 
networking for devices outside of a coverage envelope. 
The IoT is being supported by availability of open-source software products designed specifically for 
IoT applications and the development of IoT-related standards. Industry working groups such as the Open 
Web Applications Security Project, IEEE, and the IETF have developed standards and open-source software 
capabilities to support independent development of IoT-related software [63] [64] [65]. The ZigBee 
Alliance, a consortium of industry organizations involved in the development of IoT capabilities, has 
recently established the Connected Home Over IP project to promote standardization [66]. 
Furthermore, there is a trend toward increasing levels of intelligence in networked devices and 
applications. Systems hosted across networks can display varying levels of automation, autonomy, or even 
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intelligence. In particular, systems employing machine learning—a technique in which machines are 
trained through controlled repetition to perform tasks in a process that mimics the way humans learn to 
do tasks through practice—are becoming relatively common. Machine learning can range from 
applications that employ statistical methods and feedback to more sophisticated applications (e.g., deep 
neural networks) that actually attempt to model human-learning processes. Although the use of 
sophisticated algorithms that learn can significantly improve processes and controls, the processing 
required to enable even relatively simple learning can be intensive. Thus, the drive for automation and 
autonomy within the IoT creates a need for more processing than can be supported within most devices, 
and subsequently encourages the use of more fog and mist computing structures. 
Based on our survey of IoT-related technology, we identified several trends that could create novel 
and/or heightened cybersecurity risk: 
• Increased scale. The increased scale of the IoT will expand the attack surface while stressing 
defenses. Cybersecurity analysts will have a larger quantity and variety of network traffic to 
monitor, because the IoT supports higher levels of human-to-human exchange of multimedia 
material via enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) and increased levels of machine-to-machine 
(M2M) communications. Analytic tools will need to be both scalable and adaptable. 
• Evolution from cloud-computing to fog-computing structures. Increased automation, autonomy, 
and robotics have contributed to an evolution from highly centralized cloud computing to more 
responsive, more distributed fog and mist computing. Analytic capabilities are hosted at points 
within the communications architecture, including within devices themselves when possible, 
closer to the network edge. By distributing analytics and other processing, latency and the volume 
of network traffic are reduced, whereas reliability increases. However, the evolution from 
centralized to decentralized architectures will demand increasingly portable analytic tools. 
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• Move toward virtual networks. Increased use of “virtualization”—software-defined-networks, 
virtualization of network functions, and even virtualization of whole networks—is critical to 
meeting the varied needs of IoT applications. The ability to “stack” virtual networks, each with its 
own discrete quality of service and security, within a physical network architecture enables 
customized service to applications with unique requirements. Increased virtualization, however, 
creates new attack surfaces as network components become potential targets, and it creates 
additional challenges for analytics that must operate on a holistic level as well as provide 
cybersecurity for customized slices. Figure 4-1 illustrates the concept of network visualization in 
a notional urban environment. Both radio access and core networks are divided into virtual 
networks operating across the same physical space. Different services, each with various quality 
of service needs supporting critical functions within a shared physical space, have access to a 
virtual network customized to their discrete needs. 
 
Figure 4-1 Network Virtualization 
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• M2M communications. Increased dependence on M2M and D2D communications will require 
adaptation of existing network security techniques to the large number of devices with limited 
security operating on networks and more dynamic network architectures. The growing number 
of devices with limited processing and the dynamic nature of D2D connectivity will require 
reevaluation of the concept of “endpoint” in terms of cybersecurity. Specifically, robust endpoint 
security will become more challenging, and networks will require additional analytic capabilities 
to evaluate the content of a network at any moment and what is happening at its endpoints. 
• Greater physical risk. The expanding number of connected devices with at least some processing 
power at the heart of the IoT also presents new risks. Connected devices such as security cameras, 
sensors, and controls will frequently operate outside of security perimeters and may be 
compromised by persons with physical access. The number of these devices will also mean 
broader exposure to supply chain risks. 
• Lower-cost, lower-power devices. The IoT is enabled by cost-effective devices with low power 
consumption connected to networks. Consequently, many connected devices will not have 
sufficient processing capacity to support comprehensive security. The presence of relatively 
unsecured devices on the Internet will place a burden on analytic tools to detect anomalous and 
undesired behaviors. 
Best practices include adoption of a layered model of cybersecurity, as illustrated in Figure 4-2. It is 
important to put measures in place at each of these levels to secure hardware, software, networks, and 
data. As outlined in the list of trends, the emerging IoT will place new stresses at each level of 
cybersecurity as well as additional dependence on existing cybersecurity practices, including the adoption 
of Zero Trust Architectures and Endpoint Detection and Response. As the definition of the network 
perimeter shifts because more endpoint devices lack sufficient capacity to perform robust security, and 
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as other parts of the perimeter become more dynamic, robust cybersecurity will require a different 
approach to securing networks [67]. 
 
Figure 4-2 Key Layers of IoT Security 
4.3 Cybersecurity Analytics Vision 
A number of vignettes, scenarios, and use cases describing potential IoT-enabled attack vectors were 
developed to serve as the bases for more detailed future analyses. In developing these use cases, a 
number of new vulnerabilities arising from IoT-enabled applications were envisioned, and scenarios and 
use cases were constructed based on those vulnerabilities. Automation of industrial control systems and 
similar applications (e.g., smart home applications) was seen as not only introducing a large array of 
devices with limited processing to support cybersecurity, but also as opening a potential conduit for 
attacks on infrastructure and public services. Use of biometric measurement devices connected to 
personal area networks was seen as creating new concerns regarding privacy because cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities could be exploited to access private data. D2D communications-supporting applications 
ranging from emergency rescue to autonomous vehicles present highly dynamic, hard-to-characterize 
perimeters that were expected to present unique challenges to secure. Highly virtualized networks, which 
may be required to support applications with high levels of autonomy, will require that network analysts 
have the ability to rapidly and correctly interpret behaviors across a wide range of highly specialized 
topologies. 
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Additionally, a range of potential cyber-physical effects with impact well beyond the range of target 
surfaces were identified. Control systems that operate public utilities (e.g., water and electricity), 
industrial processes, and even home and building physical plants are becoming more automated and 
connected, and therefore vulnerable to cyber sabotage. Medical processes collect greater amounts of 
data using IoT devices and store them in databases, potentially enabling substantial amounts of sensitive 
private data to be compromised in a breach. Financial and banking agencies move large amounts of 
information and money electronically, increasing the potential for loss of private financial information and 
possibly enabling theft or manipulation of transactions by external actors. Transportation systems and 
autonomous vehicles become subject to attacks capable of causing large-scale disruptions to daily life or 
even injuries. To make things more complicated, the ultimate target of an attack may be at some distance 
from the attack surface. For example, one can readily envision an adversary attempting to access financial 
services software via an attack on a bank’s smart building network or attempting to access legal or medical 
records through an attack on an ad hoc emergency services network (see Figure 4-3). 
 
Figure 4-3 Hypothetical Attack on Legal Records via an Ad Hoc Network 
The diversity, complexity, and scale of the IoT mean that analytics will become increasingly important 
in providing cybersecurity. Specifically, cybersecurity can no longer depend on defending the perimeter 
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and keeping dangerous and malicious entities off the network—it will need to be supplemented by 
continuous monitoring and assessment of the networks to detect and identify malicious actors that have 
circumvented cybersecurity measures and entered the network. This requires a robust analytic 
capability—consisting of cybersecurity analytic software as well as trained analysts—to continuously 
monitor network performance and identify anomalies. We identified eight vision elements characterizing 
the needed evolution in cybersecurity analytics to meet the needs of the IoT. 
• Analytics will need to be increasingly portable and scalable. As processing with IoT-enabling 
architectures becomes increasingly distributed, analytics will need to be hosted in a variety of 
platforms capable of accommodating various levels of processing. In addition, they will need to 
monitor and evaluate networks with increasingly varied topologies and sizes, creating a need for 
increased scalability. 
• Analytics will need to be decomposed to enable them to support distributed execution. Advanced 
cybersecurity analytics will require decomposition to enable operation across sectors, closer to 
the edge and endpoint, and on virtualized networks with customized quality of service and 
security capabilities. It is easy to conceive of analytics consisting of thin clients in smaller devices 
with larger applications hosted in fog- or cloud-computing facilities. 
• Analysts will need the ability to compose advanced analytics from existing analytics. Even as 
analytics require decomposition for hosting in devices and in processing facilities near the 
network edge, cybersecurity analysts will need to be able to compose simple analytics operating 
at the edge into advanced cross-sector analytics while maintaining acceptable levels of analytic 
rigor. 
• Decentralized and virtualized architectures will have a profound effect on machine-learning–
based cybersecurity analytics. Similar to a human operator becoming more proficient at a task by 
performing the task, machine-learning–based analytics become more effective by repeatedly 
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performing their assigned tasks. As cybersecurity analytics become more physically distributed or 
customized to meet the needs of specific network “slices,” it is likely the analytics deployed 
toward the edge or to monitor customized slices will be exposed to a less representative cross-
section of network traffic. This constrained training could affect the quality of training, and 
mechanisms to present distributed analytics with more robust training sets may be required. It 
may be necessary to generate training sets to support supervised machine learning or to 
implement forms of federated learning to augment the data presented to the analytics during 
normal operation. 
• With the growth of the IoT, analysts will be required to rapidly interpret larger, more complex 
cybersecurity environments. Visualization capabilities of analytics packages will need to evolve to 
enable users to maintain situational awareness of larger-scale and potentially more complex 
network traffic. In particular, they may need to be adapted to enable analysts to make sense of 
more dynamic network perimeters in which devices enter and join a network on an ad hoc basis 
(e.g., a network supporting autonomous vehicles) and in which significant portions of the network 
traffic are virtualized. 
• The need for responsiveness to a cyber-attack drives the need for dynamic analytic tasking near 
the edge. As the cyber environment shifts, analysts will need to dynamically task analytic software 
with responding to the changes. Analytics deployed in platforms with limited processing may not 
be able to execute a full suite of cybersecurity analyses concurrently; it may be necessary to 
modify analytic performance dynamically based on the current environment. Analysts may need 
to modify search characteristics or insert intelligence into analytic packages to enable them to 
perform more effectively in a prevailing environment. 
• As the cybersecurity environment increases in scale and complexity with the growth of the IoT, 
automated analytics will need to help human analysts manage the ever-increasing workload. 
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Cybersecurity analytics need to be designed to maximize human-machine coordination. 
Increasingly, analytics will require the capability to interpret the cybersecurity environment and 
generate alerts for network operators. 
• Lastly, cybersecurity analytics developers need to be cognizant of the ability of threats to extend 
across critical sectors. 
4.4 Defining the Role of Government 
At a minimum, government will need to secure their own networks from intrusion and compromise 
of important data. As the IoT continues to grow and become increasingly ubiquitous, protecting 
government and partner computers’ networks from cyber threats will become increasingly challenging. 
Government agencies will be housed in smart buildings connected to city-wide smart grids. They will have 
fleets of vehicles sharing the transportation network with autonomous vehicles and connected to the 
transportation grid. Government employees will work using phones, tablets, and computers connected 
by the same service provider networks that serve the IoT. Government will require an evolving 
cybersecurity analytics capability aligned with the larger-scale, increasingly distributed, and fluid IT 
architectures described in the previous paragraphs. 
Beyond that, government has an interest in protecting interconnected networks that extend beyond 
the government domain, although it may have limited ability to do so. The IoT threatens to put industrial 
processes, public utilities, public health, transportation, and financial services increasingly at risk of cyber-
attack. It heightens the risk of economic damage (e.g., a shutdown of critical industries or services or theft 
of financial assets), compromise of sensitive data (e.g., medical, financial, or legal), or cyber-physical 
terrorism (e.g., hijacking of drones or aircraft, release of toxic materials). Yet, while each of these results 
may have clear national security implications, the fact that many of these attacks will be targeted at 
private computing networks may limit government’s ability to act. 
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The public sector will need a vision for the likely impacts to its programs and initiatives, and potential 
cyber-analytic capabilities to respond to the likely emerging challenges of an increasingly distributed, 
virtual, and dynamic IoT cyber environment. That vision needs to include comprehensive security for 
government and partner networks, and should, where possible, include increased cognizance of and par-
ticipation in securing the entirety of the IoT. As this paper is being written, much of the planet is in 
lockdown, possibly the result of trafficking animals in a relatively small corner of the planet [68]. In much 
the same way, computer systems and international networks everywhere can be placed at risk from 
failures to police networks anywhere. The ubiquity of the IoT makes it harder, if not impossible, to 
“quarantine” parts of it, and calls for a broader government role in securing the IoT. 
The public sector vision includes the following: 
• Government must first secure its own networks. This means having the ability to evaluate 
cybersecurity analytic capability, as well as maintaining access to the most up-to-date and 
effective tools and deploying them on government networks. 
• Government requires increased situational awareness, not only over its own networks, but over 
the entirety of the IoT. As the IoT grows, the ability of malicious actors to propagate will only 
increase, thus early awareness and understanding of threats will be increasingly vital to securing 
computing and network resources. Government will need to partner with its constituents to 
expand the data types, sources, and corresponding analytics to gather the appropriate situational 
awareness in IoT devices and IoT-enabled systems to meet its role as the nation’s risk advisor. 
• Government should be proactive in partnering with the private sector to provide guidance and 
assessment related to cybersecurity analytics. While its ability to affect private networks may be 
limited, government has a clear stake in promoting a secure cyber environment beyond the public 
sector. Government should, wherever it can, leverage its role as an advisor and a public advocate 
to communicate and promote adoption of best practices throughout the cyber environment. 
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• Government may need to take an active role in guiding the development of cybersecurity analytic 
capabilities to meet the demands of the IoT. Where existing tools demonstrate gaps or 
vulnerabilities, government may need to take the lead in sponsoring technical development to 
address observable shortcomings. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The IoT represents a significant change in the way humans and machines will interact in the future. 
Not only does it represent a massive change in scale as more and more devices exchange increasing 
quantities of network traffic, it also will incorporate radical new technologies that redefine what a 
network is. New physical connections, including D2D connectivity, will enable ad hoc networks that can 
rapidly be deployed in emergencies and support autonomous vehicular traffic. Virtual networks will 
enable the creation of networks within networks, each with its own unique quality of service and security. 
To respond, cybersecurity analytic capabilities will need to undergo dramatic reevaluation. 
Increasingly, the analytics designed for cybersecurity applications will need to become more portable, to 
enable them to operate in smaller devices with less computing capacity, and more scalable, to monitor 
larger and more diverse networks. Functionality will require decomposition, to support interpretation of 
local networks and network slices, and aggregation, to enable analysts to discern network trends based 
on behaviors observed on subsets of the larger network. Machine-learning–based algorithms will require 
new ways to train algorithms that are exposed only to customized traffic. Analysts will need capabilities 
that allow them to visualize the larger, more dynamic IoT, to handle the additional workload associated 
with maintaining cyber awareness, and to dynamically respond to it. 
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To ensure success, government has a role in promoting a more secure IoT. It must first protect 
government networks, providing the ability to access, evaluate, and deploy analytic capabilities that meet 
the challenges of the emerging IoT. Government will need to be increasingly cognizant of what is 
happening on the IoT, and will have a stake in leveraging its role as an advisor to ensure that evolving best 
practices are implemented throughout both the public sector and the private sector. Lastly, government 
may need to promote and invest in cybersecurity analytic tools to address critical gaps. 
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5 IDENTIFICATION OF BOTNET ACTIVITY IN IOT NETWORK TRAFFIC USING MACHINE 
LEARNING 
5.1 Introduction 
In recent years, botnets have emerged as a serious threat to cybersecurity because they provide a 
distributed platform for performing a multitude of malicious activity such as distributed denial-of-service 
(DDoS) attacks [69], exploitation of command and control (CnC) vulnerabilities [70], phishing, malware 
dissemination, and click fraud [71]. Although computers were the original target for botnet attacks, IoT 
devices have become an increasingly common target. In 2016, the Mirai botnet succeeded in remotely 
controlling nearly half a million IoT devices by scanning the Internet for open telnet ports and logging into 
those devices, using a set of default username and password combinations [72]. 
Several Mirai variants now exist to exploit diverse IoT security; thus, protecting IoT devices from 
botnet attacks remains a priority. IoT devices use multiple means of communication such as Wi-Fi, 
Bluetooth, or Zigbee. This causes a new issue—volume and variety in traffic flow. Typically, machine 
learning classifiers create models from monitored traffic data and then detect malicious traffic flows. 
However, with increasing IoT traffic flows, there is a need to improve detection of malicious activity in IoT 
traffic. 
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows: (1) we demonstrate that machine learning, 
supervised learning, and deep learning methods can be developed to effectively identify varied botnet 
activity and (2) we also show how the performance of these classifiers scale when a large dataset of IoT 
network connection logs is used with additional types of botnets. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses related works on which 
our research builds. Section 5.3 describes the IoT network connection log dataset used in this research 
along with the additional data we captured to augment this dataset. Section 5.4 describes the supervised 
learning and deep learning classifiers used, the performance metrics used, and our methodology. 
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Section 5.5 describes our experimental evaluation. Section 5.6 provides our results and discussion. 
Section 5.7 summarizes our research and describes avenues for future work. 
5.2 Related Works 
5.2.1 Anomaly Detection Models for Smart Home Security 
Our research focused on detection of botnet traffic in smart-home environment networks. Prior work 
by Ramapatruni et al. [73] focused on anomaly detection within similar home environments through 
analysis of device behavior using Hidden Markov Models (HMMs). HMMs were used to learn common 
behaviors, such as actions and signals, from devices in the smart-home environment. Using HMM with 
tuned hyperparameters, a detection accuracy of 97% was achieved. 
Although this prior work focused on the analysis of device actions and signals to detect anomalous 
behavior, our research focused strictly on network traffic to detect botnet activity. 
5.2.2 Detection of Mirai Attacks 
Our research focused on the detection of Mirai botnet and similar botnet activity. Previous work by 
Kambourakis et al. [72] proposed a network-based algorithm for detecting IoT bots in a Mirai simulation. 
Their research considered preconditions (e.g., telnet port open and default credentials) and performed 
signature-based detection against incoming Mirai packets, only sampling a fraction of the devices at a 
time. For the purpose of optimization, the algorithm minimized the cost associated with average detection 
delay in detecting a compromised device. 
Our work assessed the effectiveness of machine learning classifiers to detect botnet activity in home 
IoT environments, seeking to improve on current top performance results of the botnet detection 
capability in an IoT environment. Our work uses accuracy, detection, and false alarm rate as performance 
metrics. This differs from previous work that considered sampling rate and detection delay cost as 
performance metrics. 
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5.2.3 IoT Security Using Deep Learning and Big Data 
Our research was geared toward the use of big data and machine learning to enhance security for 
large volumes of packet traffic. Prior work by Amanullah et al. [74] used an LSTM model combined with a 
CNN on popular security datasets, such as NSL-KDD, KDD99, and UNSW-NB15, and achieved results of 
accuracy of 97%, detection of 98.03%, and false positive rate of 4.08%. 
Our research attempted to improve upon these results using a different dataset including benign data 
we captured from a testbed environment as well as a different set of machine learning classifiers. 
5.2.4 Imbalanced Datasets for Traffic in Industrial IoT Environments 
Our research considered a scenario in which network traffic is a “haystack” of benign data, with a few 
“needles” of malicious traffic data within. Thus, the dataset used in our research to train our classifiers 
was unbalanced. Prior research by Zolanvari et al. [75] also applied machine learning to detect attacks 
within unbalanced datasets. Their research focused on network traffic collected within Industrial Internet 
of Things (IIoT) environments; their collected traffic had low amounts of attacks, thereby resulting in an 
unbalanced dataset for training their classifiers. 
5.3 Datasets 
5.3.1 Stratosphere Lab IoT-23 Data 
The Stratosphere Lab IoT-23 dataset (hereafter simply IoT-23) contains network traffic from the 
Amazon Echo home intelligent personal assistant, Phillips Hue smart light-emitting diode (LED) lamp, and 
Somfy smart door lock IoT devices; this network traffic is labeled as either benign or infected with the 
name of the executed malware sample. The downloadable dataset, as well as details on the IoT devices 
used and the network setup, are available on the Stratosphere Lab website [76]. 
5.3.2 Additional Benign Data Capture 
Additional benign network traffic PCAPs were captured from an Amazon Echo home intelligent 
personal assistant and a Phillips Hue smart LED lamp. Additional captures used the testbed setup depicted 
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in Figure 5-1. These devices provide similar real-time activity (e.g., requests, responses, service calls), and 
the network setup is a similar unrestrained Internet connection without induced malicious activity. 
 
Figure 5-1 IoT Testbed Architecture 
Wireshark was used to capture the network traffic in this testbed and generate new PCAPs from it. 
The Zeek tool [77] then converted the PCAPs into separate connection log files. These log files provided 
traffic flows similar to IoT-23, with attributes matching those of IoT-23. 
5.3.3 Small Dataset and Large Dataset 
A small dataset and a large dataset were created for testing the performance of machine learning 
classifiers to detect malicious botnet behavior. 
The small dataset was created using a subset of the IoT-23 dataset. First, the Zeek network connection 
logs from the IoT-23 3-1, 8-1, 20-1, 34-1, and 42-1 captures, as described in [76], were combined. Then, 
from this combined dataset, 32,382 benign data points and 1,676 malicious data points were randomly 
extracted, creating a benign to malicious ratio of 95% to 5%. Of note, the malicious data included in the 
small dataset was infected with Muhstik, Hakai, Torii, Mirai, and Trojan botnet malware. The total size of 
the small dataset was 11.1 MB. 
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The large dataset was created by combining all the Zeek network connection logs from all the IoT-23 
data captures shown with the Zeek network connection logs created from the benign data captured from 
the testbed described in the previous section. There is a wider variety of botnet behavior in the large 
dataset compared to the small dataset—the malicious data contained in the large dataset was infected 
with Mirai, Torii, Trojan, Gagfyt, Kenjiro, Okiru, Hakai, IRCBot, Hajime, Muhstik, and Hide and Seek botnet 
malware. The large dataset contained a benign to malicious ratio of 95% to 5%, the same ratio contained 
in the small dataset. This ratio gives a needle-in-the-haystack representation of malicious behavior 
representative of a real-life scenario. Altogether, the large dataset contains 30,854,774 benign data points 
and 1,623,938 malicious data points. The total size of the large dataset is 3.7 GB. 
5.4 Methodology 
We used several different machine learning algorithms and performance metrics to demonstrate the 
robustness and efficacy of our approach. 
5.4.1 Machine Learning Algorithms 
The following supervised deep learning and machine learning algorithms were used to develop 
classifiers for botnet activity detection: decision tree, random forest, multiclass decision forest, two-class 
neural network, and multiclass neural network. 
The decision tree classification algorithm creates a tree structure representing a sequential decision 
process in which an input data point’s attribute values are consecutively tested to determine the data 
point’s classification. A decision tree is composed of a root node, internal nodes, and leaf nodes that 
contain the possible class labels. Within each internal node, the value of the attribute assigned to the 
node is tested to determine the next node to progress to along the tree’s path. Once a leaf node is 
reached, its label will represent the input data point’s identified classification [78]. 
The random forest classification algorithm is an ensemble-learning method in which multiple decision 
trees are constructed, and the mode value of the classes predicted by the individual trees is used to 
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classify the input data point. Each decision tree in the forest considers a random subset of features and 
only has access to a random subset of the training data, thereby increasing diversity and potentially 
resulting in more robust classification predictions compared to individual decision tree classifiers [79]. 
The multiclass decision forest algorithm uses decision trees and bagging to predict a target that has 
multiple values. The underlying model upon which this is based is the random forest, which is composed 
of multiple decision trees, with the final classification decided by majority voting based on the predictions 
[80]. 
The two-class neural network classification algorithm is a set of interconnected layers of nodes that 
perform binary classification. In concept, a neural network consists of an input layer, any number of 
hidden layers, and an output layer. This design has activation nodes at each layer, and this is done over 
iterations. Input layers use input vectors, hidden layers calculate weighted values, and the output layer 
generates a weighted sum from each input data point. The identified classification is determined after all 
iterations complete. One of the main benefits with this neural network is that it decreases the number of 
false positives in larger datasets, making it a strong selection for needle-in-the-haystack datasets [81]. 
The multiclass neural network classification algorithm is similar to a two-class neural network, but is 
capable of identifying multiple labels. Additional considerations are that the inputs are the first layer and 
connected to an output layer by an acyclic graph composed of weighted edges and nodes. Between the 
input and output layers are hidden layers. The number of hidden layers can be configured to optimize 
performance based on the type of classification being performed. The nature of this multiclass neural 
network is that it performs predictions over multiple candidates and then uses the weighted values to 
predict a single output target value [82]. 
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5.4.2 Performance Metrics 
The following metrics were used to measure the performance of the machine learning classifiers on 
the small and large datasets: 
• Accuracy = (True Positive + True Negative) / (True Positive + False Negative + False Positive + True 
Negative) 
• Probability of Detection = True Positive / (True Positive + False Negative) 
• Probability of False Alarm = False Positive / (False Positive + True Negative) 
The accuracy is equivalent to the proportion of correctly classified data points, the probability of 
detection is equivalent to the proportion of correctly predicted positives, and the probability of false alarm 
is equivalent to the proportion of negatives incorrectly predicted as positives. 
K-fold cross validation was used to train, test, and evaluate the classifiers using the three metrics 
described. Using K-fold cross validation where K=10, the dataset was divided into 10 sections or folds. 
During the first iteration, the first fold was used to test the model and the remaining folds were used to 
train the model. During the second iteration, the second fold was used to test the model and the 
remaining folds are used to train the model. This process is repeated until all folds were used as the test 
set [83]. 
Additionally, information gained for each feature in the dataset was calculated to rank the relative 
importance of features used by each classifier. Information gain is a feature evaluation method that 
measures the amount of information a feature provides in terms of the change in entropy. 
Entropy is defined as: 
 𝐻 =  − ∑ 𝑝𝑘 log2 𝑝𝑘
𝐾
𝑖=1  (1) 
where pk denotes the proportion of instances belonging to class k (K = 1, …, k). 
Following from this, the change in entropy, or information gain, is defined as: 








where m is the total number of instances, with mk instances belonging to class k, where K = 1, …, k [84]. 
5.4.3 Methodology 
Our methodology was as follows: (1) We leveraged the IoT-23 dataset, using a small fraction of it to 
form a small dataset containing 95% benign data and 5% malicious data from five botnets; we combined 
the IoT-23 dataset without our captured benign data to form a large dataset, containing 95% benign data 
and 5% malicious data from 11 botnets. (2) We considered several machine learning models and chose 
the models with the most promising initial performance on the small dataset to further optimize. (3) We 
ran our optimized machine learning models on the small dataset and increasingly bigger subsets of the 
large dataset, using accuracy, probability of detection, and probability of false alarm as performance 
metrics. (4) We described the best practices from our research that has produced competitive results. 
5.5 Experimental Evaluation 
In our experimental evaluation, we considered several machine learning algorithms and both small 
and large datasets. We used this approach to determine whether the problem of effectively identifying 
anomalous IoT network traffic is dependent on the amount of data and/or the type of machine learning 
method used. 
5.5.1 Experimental Setup 
For small datasets, the Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (Weka) was used to calculate 
information gain on the features of the datasets. Classification accuracy is the standard on which Weka 
calculates information gain for each feature and rank each feature of the set. Using Weka and the Python 
Scikit-learn library, the machine learning classifiers were applied to the small dataset within a local 
environment, as shown in Figure 5-2. 
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Figure 5-2 Local and Big Data Environment 
For large datasets, the Microsoft Azure environment was used to store and combine IoT-23 data with 
the captured benign data from the testbed to create the large dataset. The Azure environment includes 
the Azure Machine Learning studio that was used to calculate information gain on the features of the 
datasets, specifically a Permutation Feature importance module that calculates information gain on a set 
of features [85]. Classification accuracy and recall are the standards on which the Azure Machine Learning 
studio calculates information gain for large datasets. The Azure environment further includes a Structured 
Query Language (SQL) server hosting an SQL database that stores the large dataset and natively connects 
to Azure Machine Learning services where machine learning pipelines can be created. Machine learning 
classifiers were applied to the large dataset within the Azure environment as shown in Figure 5-2. 
5.5.2 Small Dataset Experiment 
The following models were generated on the small dataset: decision tree, random forest, multiclass 
decision forest, two-class neural network, and multiclass neural network. This was done to measure initial 
performance feasibility of the models and to choose the models with the most promising initial 
performance to optimize. From this initial comparison, the best performing models in terms of the 
performance metrics described in the previous section were the multiclass decision forest and multiclass 
neural network models. 
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Fields from the Zeek network connection log files were used as features for each of the machine 
learning classifiers tested. Preprocessing was performed to one-hot encode the non-numerical features 
in the dataset. Additionally, a packet spacing feature was derived by calculating the timestamp-delta of 
packets sent from the same IP address. 
For the multiclass decision forest, the resampling method, number of decisions trees, maximum depth 
of the decision trees, number of random splits, and minimum number of samples per leaf node 
hyperparameters were optimized. Specifically, the bagging resampling method was used. With bagging, 
each tree is grown on a new sample, created by randomly sampling the original dataset with replacement 
until the dataset is the size of the original. The number of decision trees used was 16, the maximum depth 
of the decision trees used was 32, and the number of random splits used was 128. The minimum number 
of samples per leaf node used, representing the minimum number of cases required to create any leaf 
node in a tree, was 20. 
For the multiclass neural network, the hidden layer specification, number of hidden nodes, number 
of learning iterations, learning rate, initial learning weight, and normalizer hyperparameters were 
optimized. Specifically, one hidden layer with 100 nodes was used, with the number of nodes in the input 
layer equal to the number of features in the training data. One thousand learning iterations were used. A 
learning rate, representing the speed at which the model changes according to estimated errors, of 0.1 
was used. An initial learning weight of 0.95 was used. A binning normalizer was used, which creates bins 
of equal sizes, then normalizes every value in each bin by dividing by the total number of bins. 
5.5.3 Large Dataset Experiment 
Increasingly large subsets of the large dataset were used to test the performance of the multiclass 
decision forest and multiclass neural network classifiers until high performance was achieved. 
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The following sizes of large dataset subsets were tested: 
• 80,000 data points 
• 160,000 data points 
• 320,000 data points 
• 480,000 data points 
• 560,000 data points 
Importantly, each subset contained 95% benign and 5% malicious data as well as the same ratio of 
the 11 botnets as found in the large dataset. 
The Microsoft Azure machine learning environment was used for its big-data storage and 
supplementary compute power. Experimental pipelines were created within the Azure environment. The 
large dataset experimental methodology allowed for determining how well the classifiers performed on 
increased data, with a variety of malicious botnet behavior. 
The large dataset comprised multiple PCAP files, exported into connection logs format using Zeek, 
imported and aggregated at the Azure SQL database using Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio 
(SSMS). This centralized all the traffic data so that it could be used for experiments in the Microsoft Azure 
machine learning studio with optimized performance. 
For the multiclass decision forest, the bagging resampling method was used. With bagging, each tree 
is grown on a new sample, created by randomly sampling the original dataset with replacement until the 
dataset is the size of the original. The number of decision trees used was 32, the maximum depth of the 
decision trees used was 64, and the number of random splits used was 1024. The minimum number of 
samples per leaf node used, representing the minimum number of cases required to create any leaf node 
in a tree, was 1. 
For the multiclass neural network, the hyperparameters optimized were the number of learning 
iterations, an initial learning rate, an initial learning weight, a momentum parameter, a shuffle parameter, 
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and normalizer; 160 learning iterations were used. A learning rate of 0.04 was used. A momentum of 0 
was also used, with a shuffle parameter set to True. The initial learning weight of 0.1 was used. A min-
max normalizer was used that linearly rescales every feature to a closed-interval from 0 to 1. 
5.6 Results and Discussion 
Table 5-1 shows the features of the dataset that were used by the multiclass decision forest and 
multiclass neural network classifiers. 
Table 5-1 Classifier Features 
Feature Feature Description 
Derived packet 
spacing 
The timestamp-delta of packets sent from 
the same IP address. 
id.orig_p Source port. 
id.resp_p Destination port. 
proto – tcp Transport layer protocol of the connection 
is tcp. 
proto – udp Transport layer protocol of the connection 
is udp. 
proto - icmp Transport layer protocol of the connection 
is icmp. 




A partial connection that was not later 
closed. 
conn_state – SF Normal connection establishment and 
termination. 
conn_state – REJ Connection attempt rejected. 
conn_state – S0 Connection attempt seen, no reply. 
conn_state-RSTO Connection established and aborted by 
originator using RST. 
history – C History of a tcp/udp connection packet 
with a bad checksum. 
history – Sr History of a tcp connection with a SYN 
request followed by a RST (reset) flag set 
to 1 from the responder. 
history – 
ShAdDaFf 
History of a tcp connection with a 
successful three-way handshake, packets 
with payload exchange from both ends 
and terminated gracefully. 
history – I History of an inconsistent packet (e.g., 
both FIN+RST bits set). 
history – S History of a tcp connection with a SYN 
without ACK bit set. 
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Feature Feature Description 
history – R History of a connection packet with RST bit 
set. 
history – ShR History of a tcp connection with SYN, ACK 
and RST bits set. 
history – ShAFr History of a tcp connection that includes 
SYN+ACK requests as well as inconsistent 
packets of FIN+RST bits set. 
resp_pkts Number of packets that the responder 
sent. 
resp_ip_bytes Number of IP-level bytes the responder 
sent. 
 
5.6.1 Small Dataset Classification Results 
For the multiclass decision forest classifier applied to the small dataset, the most impactful features 
were the derived packet spacing with an information gain score of 0.076, id.resp_p with an information 
gain score of 0.061, and history – S with an information gain score of 0.014. The least impactful features 
were history – Sr, conn_state – REJ, and conn_state – S0, each with an information gain score of 0. 
For the multiclass neural network classifier applied to the small dataset, the most impactful features 
were the derived packet spacing feature with an information gain score of 0.087, conn_state – SF with an 
information gain score of 0.071, and id.resp_p with an information gain score of 0.067. The least impactful 
features were conn_state – REJ, conn_state-RSTO, and history – I, each with an information gain score 
of 0. 
Table 5-2 shows the performance results for the multiclass decision forest and multiclass neural 
network run on the small dataset. 
Table 5-2 Results of Classifiers Run on Small Datatset 
Performance Metric Multiclass Decision Forest Multiclass Neural Network  
Dataset size 34,058 data points 34,058 data points 
Percent True Positive 63.9% 71.0% 
Percentage True Negative 99.6% 99.4% 
Percentage False Positive 0.4% 0.6% 
Percentage False Negative 36.1% 29.0% 
Accuracy 81.75% 85.2% 
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Performance Metric Multiclass Decision Forest Multiclass Neural Network  
Probability of Detection 63.9% 71.0% 
Probability of False Alarm 0.4% 0.6% 
 
5.6.2 Large Dataset Classification Results 
For the multiclass decision forest classifier applied to the large dataset, the most impactful features 
were the id_resp_p with an information gain score of 0.075, the derived packet spacing with an 
information gain score of 0.059, and resp_bytes with an information gain score of 0.033. The least 
impactful features were history – R, conn_state – S0, and history – S, all with an information gain score 
of 0. 
For the multiclass neural network applied to the large dataset, the most impactful features were the 
id_resp_p with an information gain score of 0.026, id_orig_p with an information gain score of 0.023, and 
derived packet with an information gain score of 0.022. The least impactful features were proto – udp, 
conn_state – RSTO, and conn_state – SF, all with an information gain score of 0. 
For the large dataset, the multiclass decision forest exhibited an upward trend in accuracy, growing 
from 99.93% to 99.98% as dataset size increased. Interestingly, accuracy of the multiclass neural network 
fluctuated as dataset size increased; the accuracy ranged from ranging from 99.49% to 99.70%, with no 
steady trend as data size increased. 
Table 5-3 shows the performance results for the multiclass decision forest and multiclass neural 
network run on the large dataset. 
Table 5-3 Results of Classifiers Run on Large Datasets 
Performance Metric Multiclass Decision Forest  Multiclass Neural Network  
Dataset Size  560,000 data points 480,000 data points 
Percent True Positive 99.8% 99.7% 
Percentage True Negative 100% 100% 
Percentage False Positive 0% 0% 
Percentage False Negative 0.2% 0.3% 
Accuracy 99.9% 99.8% 
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Performance Metric Multiclass Decision Forest  Multiclass Neural Network  
Probability of Detection 99.8% 99.7% 
Probability of False Alarm 0% 0% 
 
5.6.3 Results Discussion 
Considering the unbalanced nature of our dataset (95% benign to 5% malicious ratio), the classifiers 
performed well as the dataset size increased. The following were the most consistently important features 
in terms of information gain: packet spacing, id_resp_p, resp_bytes, history – S, conn_state – SF, and 
resp_pkts. The results showed how increased dataset size and botnet diversity (i.e. amount of network 
traffic flow considered) improved classifier performance. Larger dataset sizes had more traffic flow; with 
additional traffic, the overall information gain of the features increased. The classifiers benefited from 
features with higher information gain, as they contributed to improving the probabilities of accuracy and 
detection, while minimizing the probability of false alarm. 
Results also represent real-world scenarios of IoT environments and attack vulnerabilities. Botnets 
infect IoT devices by exploiting vulnerable nodes in the network that have open ports of protocols such 
as telnet/23 and control these devices using a CnC server. The botnet binary is then transferred and 
downloaded on the target. The Mirai botnet and its variants (e.g., Okiru, Gafgyt, and Hajime) use infected 
devices to recruit new bots to join the botnet network using different techniques such as performing a 
horizontal port scan or a SYN flood attack where the bot floods the network with non-legitimate SYN 
requests to scan for random IP addresses. Having a successful connection indicates a new target was 
found, and the CnC server is notified about the connection. 
These parameters of botnet functionality can be aligned with the features our research found to have 
the highest information gain score using multiclass decision forest and multiclass neural network 
classifiers. For example, the responding port feature (id.resp_p) indicates that the victim responded to a 
request targeting one of its vulnerable open ports such as telnet to initiate a connection and load the 
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botnet binary. The history feature (history – S) indicates there was an attempt to initiate a TCP three-way 
handshake by sending multiple SYN requests without waiting for acknowledgment from the responder. 
This is evidence of a SYN flood attack to recruit new bots. Furthermore, a history of complete connections 
(history – ShAdDaFf, conn_state – SF) as well as the number of responding packets (resp_pkts) indicate a 
successful connection between the infected device and scanner and that the device is compromised. On 
the other hand, there were other features that had zero information gain scores, such as rejected 
connection attempts (conn_state – REJ), where the IoT device has potentially rejected a connection 
request from a botnet or a CnC. Similarly, (conn_state – RSTO) and (history – I) are features of connections 
that were reset and aborted by the source before reaching the destination. The presence of these features 
is an indication that the data point is negative because the compromise attempt has failed. 
The performance results of our classifiers are competitive with recently published results. Our 
research uncovered best practices that can be applied when attempting to detect malicious botnet activity 
in relatively small, unbalanced datasets. First, it is advantageous to understand the behavior of botnets 
and the aspects of network activity their presence may impact. Through this understanding, researchers 
may identify and prioritize features to use within detection classifiers that would provide the most 
information gain. Second, additional features may be derived that may make network activity patterns 
more apparent to machine learning classifiers. For example, in our research, we calculated and included 
a packet-spacing feature that made more obvious to the classifiers the time between packets sent from 
the same IP address. This derived feature was discovered to provide high information gain and greatly 
improved the performance of our classifiers. Although our research used only features found in and 
derived from the Zeek connection log, additional features may be found and derived from information 
provided in the original PCAP files. Lastly, our research showed how increasing the amount and variety of 
botnet behavior in our datasets greatly improved performance of our classifiers. Even by using just a small 
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subset of our large dataset, we were greatly able to improve performance in terms of accuracy, probability 
of detection, and probability of false alarm compared to the small dataset. 
5.7 Summary and Future Work 
In our research, we created small and large datasets leveraging the IoT-23 dataset and our own 
captured benign data. These data had an unbalanced needle-in-the-haystack makeup of small amounts 
of malicious behavior compared to benign behavior. We considered several machine learning models, 
ultimately choosing to optimize the multi-forest decision tree and multiclass neural network classifiers to 
detect malicious botnet activity. We ran these optimized models on the small dataset and increasingly 
bigger subsets of the large dataset, using accuracy, probability of detection, and probability of false alarm 
as performance metrics. We found that performance of our classifiers increased as the size of the dataset, 
amount of malicious activity, and diversity of malicious activity increased. We highlighted how our results 
are competitive with recently published results attempting to solve similar problems and described the 
best practices from our research that produced the competitive results. 
Future work could be extended to consider a wider range of IoT devices, larger datasets, and the use 
of unsupervised learning classifiers. Our research only considered network activity from three devices, 
although many more smart-home devices exist and are continuing to be manufactured. There is 
motivation to perform anomaly detection on specific brands of the same IoT devices; this would provide 
insight into network and application layers of the specific IoT devices. Lastly, our research only considered 
training from a labeled dataset; additional work could consider the implementation of unsupervised 
learning techniques, such as K-means clustering, on unlabeled data, to detect malicious activity. 
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6 A PROPOSED TRUST MODEL FOR ASSESSING CYBERSECURITY RISK IN A SUPPLY CHAIN 
CONSIDERING IOT’S IMPACT 
6.1 Introduction 
The IoT is the product of a number of intersecting technologies that have enabled ever-increasing 
levels of processing and communications to be integrated into ever smaller and less expensive devices. It 
is already ubiquitous and having a profound effect on many aspects of human activity, including the design 
and development of most products. However, even as integration of IoT-enabled capability into a supply 
chain can enhance efficiency and productivity, it also increases exposure to Internet-based threats. One 
area of particular concern is the potential for introduction of malware into a system via its supply chain. 
In this chapter, we propose a methodology for objective evaluation and decision-making related to 
cyber vulnerabilities in a supply chain. We describe potential threats to systems within their supply chains, 
identify potential trade-offs between IoT-related capabilities and vulnerabilities, and discuss a method-
ology for describing cybersecurity risks as trust relationships. Although it is not deemed possible to create 
a fully objectively quantifiable method to measure cybersecurity vulnerability, it should be possible to use 
the proposed methodology to support decision-making and identify weak links in the supply chain. 
Our contributions include (1) a brief description of the evolving cybersecurity threat, (2) an analysis 
of areas in which IoT-enabled capabilities enhance productivity at a cost of introducing additional cyber 
vulnerability, (3) a proposed trust model, and (4) a proposed methodology for evaluating cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in a supply chain using the Delphic Hierarchy Process (DHP) and Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP). Our analysis differs from other supply chain analyses in that it focuses on threats to a system via 
the supply chain, rather than on threats targeted at disrupting the supply chain. 
6.2 Background 
It has long been projected that the IoT would be a target for future cyber-attacks. The combination of 
large numbers of connected devices and the weak protections for many of those devices make IoT devices 
an ideal point of entry. This possibility became a reality a little over a decade ago. Although neither the 
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perpetrators nor their goals are known, the Stuxnet attack on the Natanz uranium enrichment plant in 
Iran demonstrated the ability of a cyber-attack to inflict physical damage across international boundaries. 
Running undetected for months, it damaged more than 1000 centrifuges, thereby degrading facility 
capability by more than 20% [86]. Stuxnet presents a model of an IoT-directed attack in that it has the 
following characteristics: 
• It targets industrial control systems. In this case, the targets were Siemens programmable logic 
controllers. 
• It depends on lateral movement to move from an opportunistic attack surface to its ultimate goal. 
In this case, the virus had to be introduced into a number of domains outside the target domain, 
and it eventually found its target even though that target was inside an air-gapped domain. 
• It is stealthy. The proliferation of devices on the IoT, even in a local slice of the IoT, makes it 
increasingly difficult to detect persistent agents. 
Another potential risk is the introduction of counterfeit components, especially electronics. Despite 
efforts to protect the integrity of supply chains, it is estimated that 15% of all spare and replacement parts 
for military systems are counterfeit [87]. There is growing concern that a nation state might attempt to 
exploit this increased dependence on automation to introduce counterfeit parts as part of an intentional 
program of sabotage. In June 2014, a U.S. contractor admitted to conspiring to ship counterfeit 
semiconductors from Hong Kong to a U.S. Navy base in Connecticut for use in nuclear submarines [88]. 
The problem is exacerbated by IoT technology. Not only are more devices autonomous and 
connected, components and subsystems within systems are connected. The average automobile has more 
than 30 connected computers, whereas a luxury automobile may have as many as 100 [89]. A modern 
Airbus A320 has approximately 2000 computers [90] that control everything from entertainment and 
environment, to maintenance and diagnostics, to key functions like fuel injection and braking in 
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automobiles and most aspects of flying an airplane. Increasingly, systems are themselves self-contained 
IoT ecosystems. 
Future technology evolutions may further exacerbate the threat: 
• Reverse engineering and cloning technologies are becoming more sophisticated. (In part, this is 
driven by foreign governments that want to reduce their dependence on U.S.-produced 
components, for fear that they contain malware.) [91] 
• The number of system components containing processors is increasing. 
• Trusted Foundry programs are no longer keeping pace with the state-of-the-art in integrated 
circuit (IC) design. Where military and aerospace applications were once a large driver of the IC 
market, they now account for only about 1% to 2% of the market [92]. 
• Lastly, introduction of Micro-Electrical-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) and nanotechnology make it 
possible to develop smaller and lower-power devices, like smart dust. This may eventually enable 
miniature electronic components to be stealthily introduced into larger non-electronic 
components. 
Critically, there is no way of knowing how many vulnerabilities exist in deployed systems or even how 
many attacks have already been launched, with persistent agents awaiting activation. In August 2020, the 
Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s U.S. Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team issued a warning regarding a collection of vulnerabilities, referred to as 
Ripple20. Ripple20 contains approximately 20 vulnerabilities, including four rated as critical using NIST 
guidelines that an adversary could use to launch zero-day cyber-attacks against systems with the Ripple20 
vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities exist within the TCP/IP stack of a popular line of commercial products. 
It is estimated these vulnerabilities are present in systems across a wide range of critical infrastructure 
[93]. 
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AI and ML are frequently applied to protect systems from cyber threats. Both of these technologies 
can enable security systems to assess and adapt to a changing threat environment more rapidly than 
humans can react. To date, neither AI nor ML driven malware have been observed “in the wild.” Although 
there are threats capable of autonomous behavior, none exhibit the adaptability of an AI/ML-capable 
agent. Agents can be programmed to respond to cues within their environment, but to date malware 
capable of altering its behavior spontaneously based on its environment has not been observed. 
AI/ML-enhanced malware could take two forms. In the first, the malware agent itself would be 
intelligent; however, this may be difficult to achieve. Both AI and ML are processing intensive. The 
processing required by an intelligent agent might limit its ability to operate in smaller, less well-protected 
devices. It might also render it easier to detect because the need for processing resources would make it 
more readily suspicious to any antivirus or security analytics. In the second form, an agent might be 
intelligently designed, controlled, and reprogrammed. Once launched, an agent could provide “cyber 
reconnaissance” information back to the control module, which in turn could modify instructions or agent 
programming intelligently. Either implementation could provide a capability for an agent that learns based 
on what works and what does not, responding to successful detections by adaptation. 
Integration of AI into malware has the potential to increase the scale and speed of future attacks and 
make them ever harder to detect. 
6.3 Developing a Framework for Evaluating the Cyber Supply Chain 
The first step in developing a framework for evaluating risks within the cyber supply chain was to 
identify how the IoT was being integrated into existing industrial systems throughout the engineering life 
cycle. To do this, we performed a literature review, looking at both currently existing practices and likely 
future practices. 
Since the advent of ICs in the 1980s and the Internet in the 1990s, there has been a move toward 
increasing connectivity and mobility. As the ability to implement complex processing in ever smaller 
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devices has increased, devices housing critical functions have become smaller and more mobile, and 
processing has been integrated into ever more devices. It has also changed the way work forces operate. 
• Devices, ranging from household appliances to complex machine tools, are often designed with 
processing capability and Internet connectivity. It is not unusual that the first task a new device 
performs is a search for local Wi-Fi to access the Internet. 
• Design processes are becoming distributed and collaborative. It is common for complex systems 
to be designed by teams of engineers and stakeholders, located in different parts of country (or 
even the planet), to leverage cloud-based collaborative services and models to develop system 
designs (a practice that has become even more common because of the Covid-19 pandemic). 
• Software development has been profoundly affected. New Internet-friendly programming 
languages ranging from Java to Python are becoming more common. Common software 
development tools, including those for managing requirements, tracking system defects, and 
configuration management, are often cloud-based and leased as software-as-a-service (SaaS). 
Lastly, as software grows in size and complexity, thereby making comprehensive testing more 
difficult, software development has become dependent on the ability to “push” upgrades and 
patches to systems via the Internet. The Windows 10 operating system has an estimated 
50 million lines of code (Google may have as many as 2 billion) [94]. An entire software industry 
has emerged that depends on selling imperfectly tested software and identifying and fixing 
problems faster than its customers can become aware. IoT devices do not contain operating 
systems with tens of millions of lines of code, but they are designed by developers whose practices 
are built around the ability to implement system upgrades via Internet [95]. 
• In the near future, manufacturing processes will be changed by the adoption of greater levels of 
automation and robotics. It is already possible for an engineer to develop a digital model of a 
component on their laptop using customized software, and have that design implemented on a 
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machine without a human intermediary. There may come a time when the entire role of 
“machinist” disappears, replaced by automation. 
6.3.1 IoT in the Supply Chain 
Figure 6-1 provides a notional view of the Internet-enabled functions that may be performed by the 
notional factory of the future, with functionality expressed at levels varying from cloud services and edge 
services down to processing performed at a factory or even at a component (tool) level. Potential 
functionality of this factory of the future include the following: 
 
Figure 6-1 Functional View of IoT-enabled Manufacturing 
Network-enhanced collaboration. Industries and government are moving to commercial cloud 
computing services. Commercial platforms such as Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure offer 
infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), platform-as-a-service (PaaS), and SaaS. These structures are readily 
scalable and tailored to collaborative use of software tools. Future designs will be executed in the cloud, 
with geographically dispersed design teams having access to designs, models, and software tools, 
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including requirements, configuration, and risk management tools. This concept was arguably 
implemented on a large scale for the first time by Boeing for use in the design and development of their 
777-commercial airliner. For the Boeing 777, approximately 2000 workstations were linked to eight 
mainframes in the Seattle area to provide development teams with the ability to electronically assemble 
and analyze the airplane. Engineers were required to develop designs at workstations, using the CATIA 
computer-aided design (CAD) system. Those designs were shared and incorporated into an evolving model 
and design. Initial models were low fidelity, but over time evolved into a manufacturing quality model 
[96]. 
Use of virtual and augmented reality to improve process and design. The Internet of the future will 
support use of virtual and augmented reality in design processes. Users will have the ability to visualize 
design and performance and even interact with design models. One application of virtual processing that 
more closely models the physical world is the use of digital twins. The concept of a digital twin is two 
decades old. It was a mirrored system, a precursor of the digital twin concept, that enabled NASA 
engineers to determine how to rescue the Apollo 13 astronauts. In the future, digital twin technology is 
expected to integrate real-time sensor data to support product, process, and service enhancements. The 
eMBB capability built into 5G-enabled IoT networks will move real-time telemetry data collected in edge 
servers to digital twins hosted in cloud platforms [97]. 
Rapid prototyping. This involves several technologies that enable rapid design, fabrication, and testing 
of prototype components for systems. In the context of this paper, it is arguably a combination of 
networked collaboration and direct digital fabrication (as discussed later). It will soon be possible for a 
team of design engineers to collaboratively develop a design for a component using cloud-based 
modeling, convert that design into an executable digital model, and deliver that software to a 3D printer 
for fabrication [98]. 
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Automated, autonomous, and robotic assembly and fabrication. Automation and robotics are already 
widely used in manufacturing. However, the IoT-enabled factory floor, in which IoT-enabled sensors, 
controls, and actuators support collection of greater amounts of data and increasing levels of intelligence, 
will be capable of greater levels of autonomy. Processing that is currently performed by programmable 
logic controllers operating in closed systems with their own unique operating systems is expected to 
migrate into edge processors. 
Direct digital manufacturing. A key component of future rapid prototyping is the ability to go directly 
from a digital design to a manufactured component or model. Engineers using CAD programs at their 
workstations can develop designs, have them converted into digital models, and transmit them directly 
to an additive manufacturing or computer numerically controlled machining center. This process enables 
more efficient rapid prototyping and production, which in turn facilitates the exploration and testing of 
novel concepts [99]. In addition, additive manufacturing processes, such as 3D printing, can save costs 
through increased efficiency. By constructing components layer by layer, rather than by cutting, these 
processes can substantially reduce waste, and, when working with expensive materials, costs. Although 
additive manufacturing is primarily used in the development of models, it has been applied in the 
aerospace and defense industries, particularly in the fabrication of titanium components [100]. 
Diagnostics and telemetry. IoT-enabled technology will support enhanced diagnostics and telemetry 
process for product improvement. Systems of the future will be equipped with sensors to monitor 
environmental conditions and effects. It will be possible to detect and identify conditions that could lead 
to system degradation and set maintenance schedules to be proactive. Telemetry data can be input into 
models to predict component failures before they happen. 
Chain-of-custody verification and unit testing. Lastly, the envisioned factory will require enhanced 
capabilities to verify the integrity of components and raw materials entering the manufacturing process. 
IoT-enabled technologies, including radio frequency identification (RFID) and micro-tagging, will enable 
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monitoring of the supply chain and environmental conditions throughout the distribution process. In 
addition, all components with processing capability entering the factory will need to be scanned for 
introduced malware. 
6.3.2 Areas of Potential Exposure 
As design, development, and production become increasingly tied to Internet-enabled capabilities, 
supply chain exposure to the Internet, and by extension to cybersecurity threats, will increase. Figure 6-2 
illustrates the life cycle of the system from the mining of required raw materials through the fabrication 
of components to the assembly, integration, and testing of components to form a system, and lastly 
through deployment and upgrade of a system during its life cycle. Throughout that process, there are 
interactions with external organizations and entities, and each of these interactions presents at least some 
level of risk. 
 
Figure 6-2 Internet Exposure within a Product Life Cycle 
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Interactions identified in Figure 6-2 include the following [101]: 
• Collaborative interactions with stakeholders and developers. Design of complex systems is likely 
to migrate toward the adoption of collaborative virtual environments. Many industries have 
adopted their own versions of this process, including digital design models, cloud services, and 
widespread access for engineers operating remotely from workstations. This efficiency comes at 
a cost of increased Internet access and thus increased risk. 
• Digital design to fabrication. The ability to go directly from a digital design to a fabricated 
component provides its greatest benefits when design engineers can develop components 
designs, possibly using cloud services such as those previously described, convert model output 
into an executable digital model, and input that directly into an additive manufacturing device 
such as a 3D printer. However, this highly efficient rapid prototyping capability will lead to broader 
access and Internet exposure. 
• Access to software development sites and tools. There are numerous tools available to support all 
aspects of software development, including coding, configuration management, requirement 
management, and defect tracking. Development sites may even be hosted in cloud services, and 
tools are frequently hosted on external servers. 
• Software upgrades. A typical system will require numerous software builds prior to deployment. 
It is unusual for software builds to be performed manually for large systems. 
• Software upgrades to manufacturing tools. In addition to the product that will be dependent on 
external software upgrades, any automated tool used in the assembly, fabrication, or production 
process will also require periodic software upgrades. 
• Distribution processes. One of the existing vulnerabilities in the supply chain is the distribution of 
components and raw materials. Processes are required to ensure the integrity of system 
components and raw materials throughout the distribution chain. 
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• Post-deployment telemetry and diagnostics. A common feature of modern systems is the use of 
diagnostic and telemetry data to support maintenance and to identify design flaws. 
• Post-deployment upgrades. A key feature of the existing software production life cycle is the 
timely deployment of software upgrades to operational systems via the Internet. 
6.4 Applying Trust 
Evaluating cybersecurity vulnerabilities in an architecture or a supply chain is currently a subjective 
process, often requiring specific subject matter expert input. Although NIST provides guidelines to help 
organizations protect themselves against cybersecurity vulnerabilities within their supply chains, they do 
not provide guidance on how to measure those vulnerabilities. There is a need for a transparent method 
for measuring cyber risk within a supply chain. 
Trust measurement deals with a problem analogous to the problem of cybersecurity measurement in 
a supply chain. A number of processes, including supply chain management, rely on trust relationships—
relationships in which one party is dependent on a second party to meet specific obligations. A substantial 
portion of the field of game theory is devoted to finding ways to model trust (“The Prisoners’ Dilemma,” 
the ubiquitous example used to introduce students to the concept of game theory, is a model to 
understand and measure the effects of trust). The cyber supply chain presents as a trust problem, and a 
critical hypothesis of our effort is that principles associated with the measuring and modeling of trust 
relationships can be applied to this problem. Specifically, every entity within the supply chain has a trust 
relationship with the entities below it in the supply chain; each must trust that antecedent entities have 
controlled exposure to cyber risks and applied best practices. Trust metrics are present in a number of 
common applications, including search engines [102]. 
There are three steps to developing a methodology for applying trust: 
• Identifying the system or network architecture to which a trust model can be applied. 
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• Identifying a trust model. For this particular study, this requires identification of the attributes 
that contribute to cybersecurity trust between two entities in the supply chain. It also requires 
development of techniques for evaluating and weighting attributes. 
• Conducting aggregation. Results from the previous two steps must be aggregated to provide an 
estimate of the cybersecurity trust of a proposed supply chain. 
The goal of this study is not to provide an absolute measure of the cybersecurity risk inherent in a 
particular supply chain, but to develop a methodology that can be used to compare supply chains and 
identify likely vulnerabilities. Development of a more precise measure would require data not currently 
existing. 
6.4.1 Identify an Architecture 
Identifying the architecture is straightforward—the supply chain itself represents an architecture. 
Each of the suppliers (of components, subsystems, and services) is an entity in the architecture. Layers 
can be identified, as can flows between entities and layers. 
6.4.2 Identify a Trust Model 
Five attributes of a cybersecurity trust relationship are proposed. The first is HISTORY, which is a 
measure of the reputation of an entity within the supply chain. Critical aspects of a HISTORY measurement 
focus on an entity’s past performance. In a supply chain in which Entity A has contracted Entity B to deliver 
a product or a service, HISTORY centers on Entity B’s reputation (i.e., does Entity B have a reputation for 
strong cybersecurity) and on Entity A’s past experiences with Entity B. Because cybersecurity incidents 
frequently are not publicized, a strong historical relationship may be more important than an industry 
reputation. 
The second attribute identified for this analysis is EXPOSURE, which is intended as a measure of 
exposure to Internet threats. A primary tenet of this analysis is that all contact with the Internet represents 
a risk, although the risk is not uniform for all processes that use the Internet. It is proposed that each 
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entity in the supply chain would report any activities requiring access to the Internet. Not all of these 
activities would have equal risk, and subject matter experts would have to be enlisted to evaluate the risk 
of each activity. However, it is intended that EXPOSURE would provide an estimate to the risk involved in 
each supplier’s development processes. 
The third attribute, PRACTICES, provides a measure of the things an entity performs to reduce cyber 
risk. There are a number of steps an entity can take to lower its cybersecurity risk, even if the Internet is 
integrated into its processes. First, it can enforce industry best practices and compliance with security 
standards. It can employ tools to detect, track, and remediate cybersecurity attacks. It can also implement 
processes for vetting employees to reduce the risk of insider threats. Again, subject matter experts would 
need to assess each entity’s security practices. PRACTICES provide a measure of what an entity does to 
mitigate cybersecurity risk. 
The fourth attribute, DEPENDENCE, reflects inherited cyber risk. In particular, cyber threats entering 
lower levels of the supply chain may, if not detected and remediated, propagate up the supply chain. 
DEPENDENCE is intended as an aggregate measure of cyber vulnerability inherited from lower levels of 
the supply chain. Measuring DEPENDENCE requires a knowledge of all the entities in the supply chain, 
including those that supply materials, products, and services. As discussed previously, there are a number 
of services in a supply chain that present a low risk of disruption to the supply chain, but could be large 
sources of risk to its cybersecurity. These services can include the following: 
• IT contractors. Outside companies contracted to supply IT services (e.g., set up and operate a 
company’s Internet) could represent an additional risk. 
• Security services. Services contracted to support Internet security, ideally, serve to reduce the risk; 
however, whom a company uses to secure its IT services will affect its cybersecurity. 
• Cloud services. Any PaaS and IaaS used by lower-level suppliers can affect a supplier’s 
cybersecurity. 
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• Automated tools. Automated tools connected to the Internet and any tools implemented as SaaS 
can present vulnerabilities. 
• SaaS, IaaS, and PaaS. Capabilities as a service that rely on the Internet as a delivery and access 
mechanism could represent risk. 
• Distribution services. Distribution services refers to the transport and warehousing of 
components. Delivery mechanisms for software also need to be evaluated. 
The final attribute, TRANSPARENCY, indicates a measure of a supplier’s willingness to provide 
complete and accurate information. Trust in cybersecurity depends on transparency between 
organizations. If Company A contracts Company B to provide a product or service, Company A has to be 
confident that Company B is being transparent about processes that require Internet access and about its 
practices to protect its networks and information. Figure 6-3 illustrates how these attributes can be 
applied. 
 
Figure 6-3 Applying the TRUST Framework 
Perhaps the greatest challenge in using trust to evaluate cyber risk is identifying methods for assigning 
values and weights to the attributes. Because of the large quantity of unknowns associated with 
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cybersecurity and cyber-related threats, these evaluations are largely subjective and dependent on 
subject matter expertise. Thus, there is a need for a process to elicit subject matter expertise and present 
it in an objectively quantifiable manner. 
A number of techniques are available to support objective assessments based on subjective criteria. 
Two popular techniques are DHP and AHP. The two can be used in tandem [103]. 
DHP is a systematic procedure for eliciting expert opinion, relying on anonymity, controlled feedback, 
and statistical group response. Critical features of DHP are that it is structured, it is executed in a step-
wise fashion, and all responses are, to some extent, reflected in the final result. A goal of DHP is to move 
toward a consensus result [103]. 
In AHP, experts are presented a comprehensive series of pairwise comparisons, pairing options to 
selection criteria. Experts are asked to provide input as to which is better and to rate the comparisons 
based on importance. They may also be asked to provide a rough estimate of the magnitude of the 
difference between options. Posing more concrete comparisons, rather than abstract assessments, 
enables experts to provide assessments that are more accurate. AHP is commonly used in trade studies 
and other situations in which a group decision is required to select between options. DHP and AHP are 
candidate methods for identifying weights and evaluating attributes. 
6.4.3 Aggregation 
A number of techniques have been proposed for the aggregation of attribute values in trust 
relationships: 
• A weighted sum approach is the simplest approach. It enables evaluators to input a value and 
weight to each attribute. Weight and value are multiplied for each attribute and then summed 
for all the attributes pertaining to a particular entity in the supply chain. 
• Fuzzy-logic–based modeling is a form of mathematics specifically intended for Boolean 
mathematical-like problems in which multiple values are possible. Specifically, it arose out of the 
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need for methods to indicate partial truths. Trust calculations, in particular, would seem well 
suited to fuzzy-logic–based approaches. Trust and its attributes are seldom likely to be absolute 
(no network is absolutely safe from a cyber-attack, and no system is absolutely vulnerable). Fuzzy 
models have the advantage in that they are designed to provide useful responses to ambiguous 
input. Fuzzy logic has a number of applications, including computer-aided medical diagnoses. 
• Belief theory (also referred to as the Dempster-Shafer theory) provides a method for combining 
the “beliefs” of multiple experts, taking into consideration their confidence in the result as part 
of the calculation. In assessing a supply chain, experts provide estimates of their confidence in the 
levels of protection and exposure of each entity. 
• Lastly, Bayesian methods provide a methodology for updating assessments as additional 
information becomes known. 
All of these methods are valid candidates for assessing the amount of trust a company can have it its 
supply. Because of the limited data available, it is proposed that initially aggregation be performed using 
a weighted sum as presented in the following equation: 
TRUST = HISTORY + DEPENDENCE + EXPOSURE + PRACTICES + TRANSPARENCY 
Weighted sum aggregation is simpler than the other methods; however, given the unknowns still 
associated with the use of trust to measure trust in cybersecurity, it is deemed the best approach for initial 
efforts. 
6.5 Conclusions 
The IoT is a ubiquitous, intersecting set of technologies that is changing much of the modern world. 
Because of the IoT, systems and systems of connected systems of unprecedented scale and autonomy are 
possible. These capabilities are available to both the U.S. and its adversaries; in both cases, they increase 
what is possible as well as introduce new vulnerabilities for an adversary to exploit. This paper identifies 
some instances of the former, but its focus is not the latter. 
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Military and industrial systems historically have been closed systems; they have had limited to no 
outside exposure. Although it is feasible military systems will continue to be isolated from the Internet, 
industrial systems are becoming increasingly integrated with the IoT. A consequence will be that while 
military deployed systems will continue to have limited exposure to cybersecurity threats, the industrial 
systems used to design, develop, and produce them will become increasingly dependent on the Internet 
and thus increasingly exposed to cyber threats. Although it may remain possible to operate an 
infrastructure insulated from the Internet, the cost of doing so will likely be prohibitive. A deployed system 
may have limited exposure to the Internet, but its supply chain will be intertwined with the Internet. 
At the same time that it is becoming harder to insulate a product supply chain from the IoT, the threats 
present within the IoT are becoming more sophisticated. The huge number of devices on the IoT, the 
limited processing power (and limited anti-malware capability) of many of those devices, and the 
complexity and heterogeneity of communications architectures that connect them make the IoT a target 
gateway for adversaries looking to breach networks. Developing capabilities to protect networks of such 
large scale and different topologies represents a possibly insurmountable challenge. At the same time, 
the avenues of attack have become more sophisticated and capable. The last decade has seen the advent 
of persistent agents and agents capable of achieving cyber-physical effects. The next decade may see 
attempts to implant counterfeit components with malware and intelligent malware. 
Although the risk of malware introduced through a product supply chain has become an accepted 
threat, there is still no accepted methodology for assessing that threat. This paper includes a nascent 
methodology, using trust measurement, for assessing cybersecurity risk in a supply chain. It includes a 
system engineering analysis of a supply chain, identifies potential use cases, and identifies architectures, 
attributes, and methods of aggregation for applying principles of trust. However, the proposed 
methodology requires validation primarily because the actual product supply chain is decades away from 
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definition. Further analyses are recommended, including efforts to refine and validate the proposed 
methodology by applying it to a number of supply chains. 
6.6 Related Efforts 
During the course of our research, we identified a several related concurrent efforts focused on the 
same problem: 
NIST has an ongoing effort to evaluate and protect against supply chain cybersecurity risks [104]. In 
August 2020, it released a tool to evaluate risk [105]. However, unlike our project, NIST efforts focus on 
preventing disruptions to the supply chain. 
The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has launched the Software 
Bill of Materials to protect supply chains from introduced malware [106]. The NTIA effort focuses on 
identifying software with known vulnerabilities. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) administers the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS) [107] and the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) [108] to identify 
requirements and policies on federal contractors to ensure compliance with cybersecurity best practices, 
including best practices for securing the supply chain. 
6.7 Voice Assistant Cyber Scenarios and Use Cases 
Users interact with a large amount of data and associated computing and processing through a variety 
of devices. Incorporating ambient computing through a voice interface for cyber capabilities opens the 
aperture on its value to a wider range of situations. Provided next are examples where this voice assistant 
interface could improve current user experiences. 
6.7.1 Use Case #1: Low Cyber Skilled (Average Smart Home, IoT Devices Owner) 
A homeowner with limited understanding of computing and the Internet installs a personal cyber 
assistant to help protect their devices and personal information. The personal assistant connects with the 
main router in the house; the homeowner provides the serial number. Once installed, the personal 
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assistant detects and inventories all the devices connected to the associated IP address. The personal 
assistant provides that inventory to the homeowner, who then provides confirmation for each device. 
Whenever a new device is detected for the first time, the personal assistant sends an alert and requests 
confirmation that the device belongs on the network. 
In addition, the personal assistant continues to monitor the home network for suspicious activity and 
alerts the homeowner. Because the personal assistant is envisioned to consist of a primary application 
connected to a router and a client, which could be loaded into a phone, the personal assistant could 
provide remote alerts to the homeowner. 
6.7.2 Use Case #2: Traveler’s Assistant (High-end IoT Application Owner with Minimal Networking) 
A tech-savvy businessperson spends a large amount of time traveling and is highly dependent on 
Internet and cellular. Their business requires the secure transmission of large amounts of proprietary and 
otherwise sensitive data. As a result, they are not comfortable transmitting that data from or receiving it 
at a hotel room, local coffee shop, or the airport. 
The personal assistant can provide real-time assessments of the security of local networks and access 
information about potentially more secure networks nearby. In addition, the personal assistant can help 
the businessperson set up a virtual private network (VPN) or other security structures to ensure secure 
transmission of information. 
6.7.3 Use Case #3: The Factory of the Future (Highly Skilled Cyber Defender) 
The IT chief of a modern factory complex has to manage a sophisticated 5G-enabled network. The 
factory contains several robotic systems connected to a low-latency, highly reliable machine-to-machine 
communications network. It also employs several digital twins. These virtual systems do not have the low-
latency requirements of the robotics systems; however, they depend on large volumes of data 
transported across broadband. Lastly, the factory deploys a state-of-the-art health-monitoring system to 
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ensure the health and safety of its workforce. Because this health-monitoring system transmits large 
amounts of personal data, it requires additional security to protect against compromise. 
Each of these networks is implemented on a single physical infrastructure. The factory leverages 5G 
features like network slicing to divide this physical infrastructure into separate virtual networks, each with 
its own discrete QoS and security requirements. The IT chief can ask the personal assistant questions, and 
the assistant can provide the IT chief guidance in constructing network slices and providing the customized 
security required for each virtual network. In addition, the personal assistant can send alerts when 
anomalous traffic is detected and interface with the IT chief to assist in assessing whether an anomaly is 
indicative of a malicious act or actor or is just an anomaly. 
6.7.4 Use Case #4: Ad Hoc Emergency Response Network (Field Operator) 
In the aftermath of a hurricane, a large urban area is flooded and loses power and communications. 
Rescue teams operating in the affected area will need to bring their own communications equipment. 
However, although their radios support limited voice communications, which will help to coordinate 
activities, many of their devices require connectivity to the Internet, and their radio systems will not 
support the anticipated level of IP traffic. 
To achieve robust IP communications, the first responders depend on an ad hoc mobile networking 
capability. Key features of this capability will be self-organizing networks and 5G-enabled device-to-device 
communications. The personal assistant will be able to assist in establishing and maintaining these ad hoc 
communications. The personal assistant will have the ability to interact with the onsite officer in charge 
of communications to identify objectives and set priorities (e.g., identifying which communications to 
drop first if networks become overburdened). It can also support stationing of unmanned aerial vehicles 
as relays. 
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7 TOWARD AN AMBIENT COMPUTING PARADIGM FOR IOT CYBERSECURITY: LOWERING THE 
COGNITIVE LOAD FOR USERS 
7.1 Introduction 
The IoT is becoming pervasive in the home, business, and mission-critical environments as more 
consumer, business, and industrial control devices are networked and IoT enabled, thus improving 
functionality in UFEs. UFEs are smart environments that have deep technological foundations, but strive 
to present only a portion of the technology to the user. This explosion of networked devices exposes users 
to many security vulnerabilities thus necessitating that those smart-system owners become more aware 
of the activity on and security of the devices on their network. 
System owners likely do not have the skills necessary nor the time needed to continuously monitor 
their network using common open-source tools. Furthermore, network defenders are often inundated by 
the sheer number and diversity of devices and associated traffic and alerts. No one individual is likely to 
be able to fully use and comprehend the data that those tools present. We propose a system that uses 
ambient computing to facilitate network security monitoring and administration for smart and connected 
environments. Ambient computing refers to technologies that allow people to use a computer without 
realizing they are doing it [109]. This work is an extension of earlier work on CHASM [1]. In this chapter, 
we combine dynamic visualization of IoT networks with a natural language query interface enabled by 
voice assistants to simplify the process of providing information about the security state of the network 
to the casual user as well as the more seasoned network defender. 
Using ML, the voice assistant integrates knowledge of the name, type, and function of devices on the 
network to communicate potential security concerns in a manner that is easily comprehensible and to 
recommend the appropriate actions needed. These capabilities will help improve the security of 
connected domains by providing the system owner a unique view into the IoT network and devices. When 
combined with other information, such as a topographical map, the enriched view could give the network 
owner the ability to monitor and protect their network with minimal cognitive load. 
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This chapter (1) demonstrates a voice assistant capability for IoT security applications that lowers the 
cognitive load on the end user, independent of their security and network skill level, (2) integrates trigger-
based PCAP capability for deep packet inspections and IoT ML development, (3) integrates an ML-based 
discovery capability to characterize devices on a network, and (4) introduces a graph analytics capability 
for visualizing network connectivity and situational awareness. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.7 discusses voice assistant cyber 
scenarios and use cases. Section 7.2 describes voice assistant applications and related works on which our 
research builds. Section 7.3 presents an overview of the system architecture. Section 7.4 overviews voice 
assistant interface design and associated commands. Section Error! Reference source not found. d
escribes the embedded underlying capability. Section 7.6 details the experimental evaluation we 
conducted. Section 7.7 explores voice assistant security concerns. Lastly, Section 7.8 presents conclusions 
and describes avenues for future work. 
7.2 Voice Assistant Applications and Related Works 
The voice assistant capabilities can be catalogued into two areas: (1) network monitoring smart 
assistance and (2) general voice user interface (VUI) applications. 
7.2.1 Network Monitoring Smart Assistants 
The growth of common IoT devices in UFEs and their respective networks opens up considerable risk 
possibilities. To combat this issue, network monitoring is useful for alerting and guiding network users 
through the security statuses of their devices. Narayanan et al. [110] developed systems that use smart 
assistance technology to regularly scan networks and users in search of needed backups, notifying a 
previously designated client in the event of positive detection. Without regular backups, systems become 
vulnerable to permanent data loss from a data breach or attack. With the combination of technology and 
human-driven backup systems, users can eliminate this vulnerability through double-layered authentica-
tion and the removal of sole human or computer error. 
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Additionally, with the constantly changing landscape of cybersecurity threats, early detection of such 
attacks has become more challenging. Even with advanced monitoring protocols, hackers can be present 
on a system for more than 100 days before being detected. Bassett et al. [111] developed a cybersecurity 
system that intakes data from a number of sources to have multiple collaborative smart agents complete 
a collection of network security tasks. This results in more data-informed decisions for security 
administrators, while simultaneously lowering their cognitive load and the potential for human error. 
7.2.2 General VUI Applications 
The diverse applications of VUI-enabled smart home devices can be further divided into two 
categories: convenience and practical. Convenience applications simplify lifestyles, without working to 
resolve any specific issue. Practical applications replace human activity to achieve necessary actions using 
the connected IoT devices. 
The majority of convenience in both home and professional UFEs involves the replacement of 
traditional appliances with smart devices for easier use. Smart home assistants can control an 
interconnected network of Wi-Fi-connected light bulbs, alarms, thermostats, and other instruments 
without any practical need for automation [112].For instance, the Amazon Alexa smart home interacts 
with users through a VUI, and is able to control any device connected to Wi-Fi through either their own 
application or Wi-Fi-connected smart plugs. Although mainly implemented through VUI, Amazon Alexa’s 
nature allows communication through e-text on mobile devices and on Amazon-provided screen displays. 
Other examples of the simplified lifestyle effects these VUI assistants provide include starting workouts, 
ordering online purchases, controlling smart homes, scheduling routines, and performing calculations. 
The variety of practical applications includes uses with real demand and necessity in home and office 
use. An IoT-based fall-detection system proposed by members of the Department of Electrical and 
Computer Engineering at the University of Kentucky uses cameras and motion sensors to identify 
potentially life-threatening falls in homes with vulnerable occupants [113]. Once activated, the connected 
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smart assistant launches a VUI-based dialogue, prompting endangered users to notify the police or 
caregivers. Such application of the smart assistant relies heavily on the vocal component of the device 
because the use of a touch-based system may not be possible in a risk situation. This allows for more 
independent living, thereby saving money and time. 
7.3 System Architecture 
The ambient computing capabilities presented in this paper leverage both internally facing and cloud-
based capabilities. This section provides an overview of the computing and network infrastructure and 
describes an end-to-end flow of a user query and its associated response through the system. 
The voice interface provides access to a set of underlying cyber-focused capabilities exposed as edge-
based RESTful services running on Raspberry Pi devices. We used two Raspberry Pi 3B devices, each having 
a four-core, 1.2-GHz Broadcom, 64-bit ARMv7 CPU, and 1 GB of RAM. The REST services return results via 
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) to an ESXi server running Linux VMs. The Pi edge devices monitored 
collection of more than 70 IoT network devices connected to the same network, and a span port on the 
network switch forwarded all the network traffic from each device to the Raspberry Pi (Figure 7-1). 
 
Figure 7-1 Raspberry Pi 
We used Amazon Alexa for business (A4B) to create the user interface. Any Alexa user registered on 
our network can connect via Wi-Fi and access A4B services in the cloud. Upon joining, the user is 
authenticated and their voice commands go to the A4B cloud account and they can access related backend 
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services in the IoT testbed. (See Section Error! Reference source not found. for an overview of the b
ackend embedded cyber services.) Figure 7-2 illustrates the data and information flowing though the 
network. 
1. An ESXi IoT VM retrieves IoT device classification from an edge-deployed Raspberry Pi (IoT Pi) 
running ML-based device classifiers. The IoT Pi monitoring the collection of Pi sends JSON 
messages via a standard syslog port (UDP port 514). 
2. The ESXi IoT VM stores the Feature File on the IoT Pi in the DMZ. All data collected here are 
processed and stored on a DMZ that can be reached by the Internet. 
3. The user’s voice commands are streamed by Alexa, using TLS 1.2, to an A4B account for processing 
by Amazon Voice Services (AVS). Amazon’s Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) processes the 
stream into text strings that are then forwarded to Amazon’s Natural Language Understanding 
(NLU) system. NLU interprets the result and produces an intent. The service then routes the intent 
to one of our custom skills. 
4. The Skill retrieves the IoT network data from the IoT host located in our DMZ. 
5. The Skill formulates the raw data into Simple Speech Markup Language (SSML) text . The response 
system then takes the SSML and uses text-to-speech to generate an audio speech file. The 
resulting audio is then streamed back to Alexa. 
6. The user sees a visualization of their IoT network from the IoT DMZ host. 
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Figure 7-2 Alexa IoT Device and Network Status 
7.4 Voice Assistant Interface Design 
Although there are many existing frameworks for the creation of voice assistant capabilities, our cyber 
assistant was developed specifically as an Amazon Alexa skill. Amazon allows for the creation of custom 
cyber-assistant capabilities through the creation of Alexa skills, which can be published and then added 
to a specific Alexa device. This framework was chosen specifically because Amazon provides a robust 
Software Development Kit (SDK) for Alexa skill development and handles any necessary speech-to-text 
and natural language processing, allowing us to focus on the development of the VUI and underlying logic. 
Internally, an Alexa skill splits an individual piece of functionality into intents, each having frontend and 
backend pieces. A specific intent’s frontend consists of the VUI, also known as “utterances” or invocation 
phrases that trigger this specific piece of functionality. The backend consists of an IntentHandler, and 
deals with the actual logic of the triggered intent [114]. The development of the Alexa skill thus began 
with the design of the voice interface and the intended functionality, with a focus on user experience. 
The Alexa skill’s goal is to provide an easy-to-use, easy-to-understand, natural cyber voice assistant; 
therefore, we gave particular care to the multiple ways in which a user could interact with the skill, as well 
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as the types of functionality provided by the skill; for instance, the voice interface needed to be able to 
handle cases where users may phrase the same request differently. Alexa specifically handled this by 
allowing multiple utterances to be tied to each intent. The specific intents and commands supported by 
the cyber assistant were also chosen by considering the kinds of information both technical and 
nontechnical users may want to know about their network. 
The different commands supported by the Alexa skill can be divided into three categories. The first 
includes administrative commands that control the overall skill and the underlying ML capability. For 
instance, a user can start and stop the Alexa skill, change certain settings including the setting of certain 
triggers and alerts, and ask for help. On the backend side, a user will also be able to start, stop, and reboot 
the ML pipeline as well as check its status. 
The second category of commands forms the bulk of the assistant’s core functionality. These are the 
commands that query the ML pipeline for specific information about the user’s network, including the 
number of devices, categories of the devices, newest device, etc. The goal of these commands is to give a 
user increased access to information about their network in a way that is user friendly and nontechnical 
so that any network owner may use this capability. 
The final category of commands includes those aimed toward users with more advanced knowledge 
of cybersecurity and networking to support a range of users. These commands will give a network owner 
access to more technical information regarding their network and allow for the configuration of 
combinations of event triggers. This category also includes the commands that integrate other cyber 
capabilities that the skill supports, including the directed PCAP and network visualization. 
This effort was focused on implementing this functionality as an Amazon Web Services (AWS) Lambda-
hosted Alexa skill, with corresponding utterances and intents. Table 7-1 briefly summarizes the commands 
that the skill currently supports, including sample invocation phrases and intended behavior. 
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Table 7-1 Core Functionality 




GetNetworkSummaryIntent Provide an overview of 
connected devices and 
status of network. 




“Tell me a summary.” 
 Number of total con-
nected devices, number 
of devices active in the 
last 24 hours, and last 
device added 
GetDevicesSummaryIntent Provide a summary 
about the connected 
devices and their 
categories. 
“How many devices do I 
have?” 
“What devices are on my 
network.” 
“Tell me about the 
devices on my network.”  
 Number of connected 
devices and number of 
connected devices in 
each category 
GetNewestDeviceIntent Provide an overview of 
the newest device on 
the network. 
“What’s the newest 
device?” 
“Get the newest device.” 
“Tell me about the 
newest device.” 
 The newest device 
added to the network, 
the time it was added, 
and the type of device it 
is 
GetLatestDevicesIntent Provide a list of 
devices added after a 
certain specified time. 
If no time is specified, 
default to last time the 
skill was used. 
“Any new devices since 
yesterday?” 
“Any new devices?” 
“How many new devices 




A list of devices added to 
the network after the 
specified time and the 
category breakdowns 
GetNetworkMapIntent Provide to the user a 
graphical representa-
tion of the network 
and devices connected 
to it. 
“Show me my network 
map.” 
 A user-viewable network 
map with labeled nodes 
and edges 
representative of the 
network and activity on 
the network 
GetPacketDataIntent Provide the user PCAP 
data collected from 
the network. 
“Capture data from the 
network for me.” 
 PCAP data from tcpdump 
HelpIntent Suggest commands to 
ask Alexa about your 
network. 
“Help.” 
“What can I ask?” 
“What can you tell me 
about my network?” 
 A list of commands 




7.5 Embedded Underlying Capability 
The voice interface provides an interface to a set of underlying cyber-focused capabilities. This section 
describes the collection of applications exposed to the user. 
7.5.1 IoT Device Discovery and Classification 
IoT discovery is foundational to providing good cybersecurity because a user needs to have a good 
accounting and understanding of the devices on a network to be able to protect and secure them. 
Furthermore, because IoT networks are dynamic by nature, the landscape will change often and thus 
require constant monitoring. Therefore, automated methods are needed to maintain situational 
awareness of networks. Our IoT device discovery and classification capability can autonomously identify 
IoT device types. Although there are many ways to perform IoT discovery, each has its strengths and 
limitations. For example, with MAC addresses, one can determine the device manufacturer. This approach 
is relatively straightforward, but it also can be spoofed or be representative of another device in the 
network chain. 
Therefore, the focus of this work is to explore discovery, profiling, and verification of IoT devices solely 
based on their network behavior or other information contained in individual or constrained groups of 
packets [1]. 
To support this goal, an ML model was trained to analyze packet sequences and predict what type of 
IoT device each packet sequence came from [2]. To construct the training data set, traffic from more than 
60 IoT devices was collected, grouped by MAC address, and arranged in time order. The data from each 
device was then transformed into sequences of 20 packets each. The values in these sequences were then 
normalized, one-hot encoded, and labeled according to device category (see Table 7-2), and an ML model 
was trained on that data. The result was a model that can take a 20-packet sequence of network data 
from a device and provide a prediction as to that device’s category. 
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Table 7-2 Supporting Metadata 
Metadata Tag Description 
“predicted_category”: “television” # This line and the next 
two are a summary of the category_scores 
Category with the highest evaluated score 
“confidence_level”: “Low”,  Confidence level of the prediction 
“confidence_percent”: 49, Score of the prediction 
“device_id”: “b8:27:eb:3d:c2:a2”, #  Unique identifier for tracking devices inside the ML pipeline 
“first_seen_ts”: #  Unix timestamp in ms (This is the time that the device was first 
detected on the network.) 
“first_seen_utc”: “2020-06-05 14:33:52.013460+00:00”, #  Human-readable version of first_seen_ts 
“last_seen_ts”: 1591887289012.231, #  Unit timestamp in ms (This is the most recent time that the 
device was seen on the network.) 
“last_seen_utc”: “2020-06-11 14:54:49.012231+00:00”, #  Human-readable version of last_seen_ts 
“ground_truth”: { Ground truth for the MAC address (if known) 
“iot_testbed_alias”: ““, Testbed alias for a device (if available) 
“iot_testbed_category”: ““ Category with the highest evaluated score 
“ip_addresses_used”:  IP addresses that the device was seen using 
“mac_address”: “b8:27:eb:3d:c2:a2”, # MAC address of the 
device 
MAC address of the device 
“mac_manufacturer”: “Raspberry Pi Foundation”, #  Possible manufacturer of the device, based on first three octets 
of MAC address 
 





• Audio device 
• Clocks 
• Router 
• Mobile device 
• Triggers and switches 




• VPN router 
• Human interface device 
The model was deployed to run in streaming mode on a Raspberry Pi, resulting in a stream of output 
predictions. A dashboard was created to aggregate and display these predictions (see Figure 7-3). 
 
 
Figure 7-3 Dashboard to Aggregate and Display Predictions 
7.5.2 Integrated PCAP 
The key element to providing cyber protections to a system is to have timely relevant data with labels 
related to the time, event, and situation that generated the event of interest. Monahan et al. states that 
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organizations using PCAP as part of their normal toolsets were more confident in the information they 
received about their environments and therefore were better prepared to protect them. Specifically, they 
had: 
• Shorter breach detection and response time 
• More confidence in their workflows and processes 
Therefore, the use of PCAP is key to providing useful cybersecurity in a network [115] [116]. However, 
gathering these data is hard because the storage capacity for full PCAP is expensive. In addition, being 
able to capture data coincident with a specific incident can be difficult because of the unpredictability of 
cyber events. To meet this challenge, we integrated a trigger-based PCAP capability that captures data 
based on passed-in configuration parameters. This gives the users the ability to perform offline deep 
packet inspection on data that are coincident with an event, and have relevant, insightful metadata stored 
with the data itself. To provide PCAP, we integrated tcpdump [117], a software program that allows the 
user to capture network packets being transmitted or received over a network to which a device is 
attached. 
The PCAP capability is composed of two parts: an Edge Sensor Service that runs on each network 
sensor and a Sensor Management Service that runs in the cloud. 
The network sensors are currently deployed as Raspberry Pis, each running the ML pipeline as well as 
a copy of the Edge Sensor Service. The Edge Sensor Service sends periodic heartbeat messages to the 
Sensor Management Service, indicating the sensor’s name, location, status (e.g., CPU utilization, CPU 
temperature, remaining disk space), and universally unique identifier. The Edge Sensor Service also listens 
for commands from the Sensor Management Service and manages the execution of those commands. 
The Sensor Management Service listens for heartbeat messages from the network sensors and uses 
that data to determine which sensors are available for tasking. The Sensor Management Service exposes 
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a REST Application Programming Interface (API) that allows a user (or other software program) to perform 
the following actions: 
• Obtain a list of all available sensors and their status. 
• Reboot a specific sensor. 
• Start the ML pipeline on a specific sensor. 
• Instruct a specific sensor to capture packets via tcpdump. The full range of tcpdump’s filtering 
capability is available, including the ability to filter by IP addresses, IP address ranges, MAC 
addresses, port numbers, and protocols. 
• Obtain the status of ongoing and completed PCAPs on a specific sensor. 
• Retrieve completed PCAPs (in PCAP file format) from a specific sensor. 
Because the Sensor Management Service exposes the above functionality through the REST API, it 
could easily be connected to other software in support of several novel use cases: 
• When a new device is detected on the network, automatically capture some of its network traffic 
for later analysis. 
• Allow the user to ask Alexa for a PCAP from a device by name. For example, “Get me some 
network data from that new thermostat that showed up on the network today.” 
• To support a cybersecurity analyst with some knowledge of ML, build additional APIs for retraining 
and redeploying the ML pipeline on the sensor, which would then allow an Alexa conversation 
such as: 
“Alexa, capture packets from that unknown device that showed up on my network today.” 
“Alexa, that device is a thermostat.” 
“Alexa, retrain the machine learning model with the new data from the thermostat.” 
“Alexa, is my new model ready?” 
“Alexa, deploy my new model to sensor X.” 
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• For the home user, a similar set of steps could be performed automatically because the average 
home user would not know about the intricacies of ML model training. An example conversation 
might be: 
Alexa: “There is one new device on your network this morning. I can’t figure out what it is.” 
User: “Oh, that’s my new smart refrigerator.” 
Alexa: “Got it. I’ll update my list.” (In the background, Alexa retrains the existing ML model to 
be able to recognize smart refrigerators, and automatically deploys the new model.) 
• In addition to training models to categorize IoT devices, this capability could be used to learn 
“normal” patterns of life of different IoT devices on the network, and alert the user if any devices 
deviate from those patterns. An example conversation might be: 
User: “Alexa, how’s my network looking today?” 
Alexa: “Your back-porch security camera started acting like a router at 3 a.m. today. You might 
want to get that checked out.” 
7.5.3 Network Mapping 
As previously discussed, the IoT device testbed implements a pipeline model in which data are 
ingested from the IoT devices via a sequential process of PCAP, feature extraction, model training, and 
model inference. To gain a sense of network situational awareness, an additional processing layer is 
needed that is responsible for network visualization, analytics, and general user interaction. This layer, 
termed IoTA for IoT Analytics, primarily taps into the pipeline after feature extraction is complete; 
however, it was designed to fuse information across several points in the pipeline (e.g., in the model 
training and execution phases). The rationale behind this design is to enable the user to aggregate and 
view IoT data from a low-level (device connections) point of view while still leveraging higher abstractions 
of data processing to provide a more complete understanding of the device network while minimizing 
user cognitive loads. IoTA leverages the IoT ML processing pipeline to enrich the visual rendering of low-
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level network data with context-aware inferences, such as device type labeling and potential threat 
quantification. 
As with most computer networks, the IoT device testbed generates large amounts of data. When 
implementing a visualization interface, one critical decision is where to position data ingest within the 
processing pipeline and where to implement the frontend to maximize deployment flexibility while 
minimizing local compute resources. For this reason, the IoTA architecture consists of two processes: the 
backend processor and the frontend renderer. The backend processor is designed to run in a convenient 
location behind the enterprise firewall, where access to network and computing resources is most 
optimal. This processor gathers and fuses information from the various levels within the processing 
pipeline and then presents a streamlined collection of data to the frontend for rendering. This process is 
intended to run on a server with sufficient computational resources to enable real-time transformation 
of data. In determining how best to aggregate data for visual representation, the system identifies 
repeated communications within a given timeframe specified by the frontend and generates a data 
structure that contains a summary of these communications. The level of detail of the summary is 
dependent on information from the frontend renderer about the context of the visualization (e.g., 
topology visualization, anomaly detection, network querying). 
The frontend renderer runs in a standard web browser for maximum flexibility. This enables 
practically any network-enabled computing device to interface with the processing pipeline across the 
enterprise firewall. Because of the limited computational resources available at the frontend, the backend 
processor essentially compresses the available data through context-based slicing and aggregation 
operations. To minimize operator cognitive load, the interface of the renderer is intentionally minimalistic 
because research has shown that cluttered interfaces greatly increase operator distraction and negatively 
influence their focus on other tasks [118]. The renderer is divided into four main sections in which content 
changes are context sensitive. In this way, only the information pertinent to the task is displayed. 
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Figure 7-4 shows the primary interface for IoTA, where the display is segmented into (1) data trans-
formations and rendering controls, (2) network device listing with filtering, (3) micro network rendering, 
and (4) macro network rendering. 
 
Figure 7-4 IoTA Frontend Renderer with Fixed Context Areas: (1) data transformation and rendering, (2) 
network device listing and filtering, (3) micro network rendering, and (4) macro network rendering 
The primary visualization method used by IoTA is force-directed clustering with semi-radial layouts 
that minimize link crossings. After careful consideration and experimentation, this method proved to be 
the most robust in presenting device network information to highlight relationships between devices 
while minimizing clutter and occlusion. Figure 7-5 presents a screenshot of this visual layout. The display 
supports zoom operations and an infinite canvas to scale well with large network collections, while using 
minimal resources on the client device. All node positions can be altered by simply clicking and dragging 
nodes across the canvas. During this operation, the layout manager continuously updates the force-
directed layout through smooth animations. This aspect is important for preserving operating context as 










to physical spatial coordinates and overlaid on spatial maps that can represent building schematics, 
geographic maps, or any other spatially relevant maps, as illustrated in Figure 7-5. 
 
Figure 7-5 Node Position Correlation with Spatial Mapping 
The visualization employs a streamlined list of visual cues, such as node/link position and size, 
node/link color, and dynamic labels, to always present an uncluttered interface that minimizes operator 
cognitive load. For example, node labels are selectively displayed based on criteria such as communication 
frequency, external network device connections, and alerts derived from the model inference output of 
the pipeline. Additional information about devices can be obtained by simply hovering the mouse over 
the device node, with click events activating various charts that capture communication patterns to and 
from the node in question. The visual renderings automatically update with new data while still presenting 
a simple horizontal scroll bar to scrub backward in time. As new network nodes are loaded, smooth 
animation sequences help preserve context as devices pop in and out of existence based on the specified 
window size and aggregation level. 
The Data Transformation and Rendering section houses controls to adjust which data sets are loaded 
for rendering. For example, the user is able to adjust the aggregation factor for communications between 
the same source and destination units, the attributes to be considered source and destination for the 
node-link model, and when and how often to update the display. Depending on the task the network 
analyst wishes to the perform, they can select from preconfigured source and destination combinations 
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that are designed to highlight important aspects of the network, such as identifying unusual system-to-
system communications or uncharacteristic communication bursts for the device involved or determining 
the type of devices with which systems communicate. 
The Network Device Listing and Filtering section of the renderer displays lists of information about 
the network (e.g., device IP address, device name, device type with associated color encodings for the 
renderer). Lists can be sorted and filtered through inexact queries, which enables rapid information 
retrieval. In addition, the visual representation in the Macro Network Rendering section is always mirrored 
by the filtered lists in this section. This approach preserves application context as the network analysist 
explores the network through query operations. 
The Macro Network Rendering section employs various visual renderings to provide a macro (or birds-
eye) view of the network under study. The purpose of this section is to provide the analyst with a quick 
method of assessing the global behavior of devices on the network. In the view shown in Figure 7-4, a 
matrix heat map is used to show the connections between all devices as well as the amount of 
communication between devices through cell color. Hovering the mouse over each cell provides more 
details about the communication between the associated devices, with click events leading to charts that 
capture historical communication patterns between devices. 
The IoTA client and server models enable additional functionality to improve human-machine 
interfacing. The server processor supports extensions to external devices to control the transformation 
and aggregation stages, which in turn affects what is rendered on the client. An extension was built to 
support interfacing with the AVS API so network analysts could perform natural language queries against 
the device network and have the filtered network displayed as instructed on the client renderer. The use 
of natural language queries combined with uncluttered visual renderings has the potential to significantly 
improve the effectiveness of network defenders and casual users alike. 
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7.6 Experimental Evaluation 
Because the goal of this work was to reduce the cognitive load on the user and make the system 
owner/user more effective, we conducted a limited study that compared aspects of preforming 
commands associated with each utterance to evaluate the cognitive load and relative difference in 
difficulty performing a command manually versus using the voice assistant. Table 7-3 compares the 
cognitive load needed for a skill and a comparative measure of reduction of the cognitive load achieved 
by leveraging the voice assistant. 
Table 7-3 Preliminary Evaluation and Comparison of Intents 





Level of Difficulty 
To Perform the 









GetNetworkSummaryIntent Number of total 
connected 
devices, number 
of devices active 
in the last 24 
hours, and last 
device added 
Wireshark 4 1 15 seconds 
GetDevicesSummaryIntent Number of con-
nected devices 
and number of 
connected devices 
in each category 
Wireshark 4 1 22 seconds 
GetNewestDeviceIntent The newest device 
added to the net-
work, the time it 
was added, and 
the type of device 
it is 
Wireshark 3 2 20 seconds 
GetLatestDevicesIntent List of devices 
added to the 
network after the 






3 2 25 seconds 
GetNetworkMapIntent User-viewable 
network map with 
labeled nodes and 
edges representa-
tive of the 
network and 





5 3 40 seconds 
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Level of Difficulty 
To Perform the 









GetPacketDataIntent PCAP data from 
tcpdump 





To formulate Table 7-3, we asked a cyber subject matter expert and a typical home IoT device owner 
to quantitatively evaluate the level of difficulty to perform each of the skills manually and with the voice 
assistant using a five-level Likert scale. We also measured the time needed to perform the skill using the 
voice assistant. This timeframe was measured from the moment the user began speaking to invoke the 
Alexa skill to the moment when Alexa stopped speaking her response to the user. The measurement for 
each intent also included the time it took for the intent to reach out to the REST API to receive a network 
summary, although the skill caches that data within sessions for increased efficiency when multiple intents 
are invoked per session. 
From these preliminary results we see that the voice can lower the relative level of difficulty to 
perform a command. Specifically, intents that provide a summary of the networks were most impacted. 
As we continue to add skill and intents, we will expand the testing to more completely evaluate the 
effectiveness of the voice assistant 
7.7 Security Concerns 
Smart Personal Assistants (SPAs) will change the way users interact with UFEs; however, they also 
present significant security and privacy issues. Keeping these applications safe without sacrificing the 
benefits of efficiency is key. Some security concerns of SPAs include synthesized speech, voice squatting, 
weak authentication, and profiling [120]. 
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7.7.1 Synthesized Speech 
Smart assistant technology lacks the ability to recognize whether the user is the legitimate owner of 
the device or an illegitimate user making a request to the device. This weakness makes SPAs unable to 
detect whether inaudible sounds or signals are requests to the device. As a result, radio signals or other 
sound waves from other technology can interfere with SPAs and cause the smart assistant technology to 
approve illegitimate requests. For example, a Burger King TV ad requests Google Home to open up 
Wikipedia and read information about the “Whopper hamburger.” 
7.7.2 Voice Squatting 
Voice squatting is a method wherein a threat actor takes advantage of or abuses the way a skill or 
action is invoked. This threat can be activated when a user prompts a request, but receives a response 
that can be a potential threat to the owner. For example, a user can prompt Alexa by saying “Alexa, open 
Capital One” to run the Capital One skill. Then, an unknown threat actor can potentially create a malicious 
app with a similarly pronounced name, such as Capital Won. 
7.7.3 Weak Authentication 
To ensure the safety of users and their networks, proper implementation of authentication controls 
is necessary for the usability of SPAs. Vulnerabilities regarding weak authentication include inadequate 
lockout implementations and the inability to determine one authenticated user from another. An example 
of weak authentication is when an SPA confuses an unauthenticated user as the owner of the device. For 
example, the daughter of an owner prompts an SPA to order a dollhouse; as a result, the SPA takes her 
order as a legitimate request to the device and orders the dollhouse without authenticating the identity 
of the user. 
7.7.4 Profiling 
Beyond the issue of authorization, SPA users face the threat of profiling. Profiling is when data are 
collected about the user’s personal information such as their interests, behaviors, and preferences. There 
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are three main types of profiling: en route profiling, profiling by third-party developers, and profiling by 
SPA providers. Attackers leverage en route profiling to determine a user’s presence during traffic analysis. 
The attacker can then use these techniques to conduct threats that are more serious. Profiling by the 
third-party developers involves the sharing of valuable personal and network information, resulting in 
malicious apps that combine various data the user has shared, thereby creating a complete profile of the 
user that may compromise the privacy of the SPA owner. In the profiling by SPA providers threat, the SPA 
makes compromises to uphold the user’s privacy by collecting sensitive data such as the user’s 
conversations, online search habits, and other information stored on the SPA. The SPA then may have 
access to personal data of the SPA user, which poses a security and privacy risk to the user [120]. 
Addressing security concerns is beyond this specific effort and therefore an area of focus for future 
work. 
7.8 Conclusions and Future Work 
7.8.1 Conclusions 
This chapter summarizes ongoing work toward integration of voice assistant technology to lower the 
cognitive load placed on a user to monitor and maintain their smart environments by providing access to 
complex capabilities in a natural way. We developed a proof-of-concept cyber voice assistant as an Alexa 
skill, which implements a set of intents that allow users to access information on their networks and the 
associated devices. Together, these intents make up the most basic user commands, which provide a 
network owner awareness of their connected devices. We evaluated the effectiveness of the voice 
assistant by capturing qualitative perceptions on the ease of use of an intent and quantitatively capturing 
the time to perform an intent from a limited user base. 
The advantage of integrating voice capability in a cyber personal assistant is that it can guide the user 
to ask the right questions the right way despite limited expertise. We understand that the ability to use 
natural language processing to support dialogue using a specialized language in which the machine may 
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be more proficient than the user will be a real challenge to achieve. Nonetheless, even with limited voice, 
the analytics that enable even rudimentary monitoring of home networks integrating voice is a potentially 
large step in securing the IoT as a whole. 
7.8.2 Future Work 
In future work, we will continue developing the capabilities of the Alexa skill to add more intents and 
incorporate more in-depth uses of visuals. Visuals are useful for enriching a user’s experience in 
combination with the voice assistant, and there are many devices that support screen visuals. We intend 
to enhance the display of connected devices through a dashboard to assist in following along with the 
information returned from the Alexa skill about the network. 
In addition to providing statistics about the network and its devices, we believe there exist other 
security capabilities worth integrating into the Alexa skill intents. The same analytics used for IoT discovery 
can be used to identify threats. For instance, if the system classifies device X as a camera but then later 
classifies it as a thermostat, this may be indicative of a compromised device. Incorporating these findings 
allows users to remain aware of and monitor the integrity of their devices to remain protected. 
Beyond work on the assistant itself, we would also like to expand our understanding of how the voice 
assistant for cyber can lower the cognitive load for a wider range of users. Our current testing methods 
rely on feedback from a cybersecurity expert and a typical home IoT owner; however, this is not a 
complete profile of all possible users. To address this, we intend to perform a more complete study to 
evaluate the efficacy of the voice assistant in lowering the cognitive load on a user by expanding the test 
user base to include a broader set of participants that span skill level and experience. Lastly, we plan to 
address the security vulnerabilities of the virtual assistants, port the edge devices to more capable 
hardware to support more in-depth integration of anomaly detection capabilities, and provide support 
for contextual conversations, thus allowing follow-on utterances and responses to be conversationally 
dependent on a previously asked question. 
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8 SUMMARY 
In this dissertation we have explored many aspects of security and privacy in the IoT space. We 
examined IoT security issues in the home and introduced the CHASM concept. We extended CHASM to 
the IoT edge deploying machine learning algorithms coincident to where data is generated. We examined 
the cybersecurity analytics capability in response to the threats from the perspective of a large 
organizational entity. We examined the use of machine learning to identify botnet activity in IoT devices 
and networks. We researched and introduced a proposed framework for assessing IoT-motivated 
cybersecurity risk and its impact on supply chains. Lastly, we examined ambient computing and its utility 
in reducing the cognitive load on users when protecting IoT-enabled networks. Lastly, we examined 
applications of these research topics to projects at JHU/APL. 
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Appendix A. Acronyms 
5G Fifth Generation 
ACK Acknowledgment 
AHP Analytic Hierarchy Process 
AI Artificial intelligence 
AM Additive Manufacturing 
ASR Automatic Speech Recognition 
AVS Amazon Voice Services 
AWS Amazon Web Services 
CAD Computer-Aided Design 
CHASM Connected Home Automated Security Monitor 
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability 
CnC Command and Control 
CNN Convolutional Neural Network 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service 
DENG Doctor of Engineering 
DHP Delphic Hierarchy Process 
DMZ Demilitarized Zone 
DNS Domain Name Server 
DoD Department of Defense 
HMM Hidden Markov Models 
HPSC High Performance and Smart Computing 
IaaS Infrastructure-as-a-Service 
IC Integrated Circuit 
IDS Intelligent Data and Security 
IIoT Industrial Internet of Things 
IoT Internet of Things 
IoTA IoT Analytics 
IP Internet Protocol 
ISI Intelligence and Security Informatics 
IT Information Technology 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
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JHU The Johns Hopkins University 
JSON JavaScript Object Notation 
LED Light-Emitting Diode 
LSTM Long Short-Term Memory 
MAC Media Access 
MEMS Micro-Electrical-Mechanical Systems 
MILCOM Military Communications 
ML Machine Learning 
NCF National Critical Function 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NLU Natural Language Understanding 
NTIA National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
PaaS Platform-as-a-Service 
PCAP Packet Capture 
RFID Radio Frequency Identification 
SaaS Software-as-a-Service 
SDK Software Development Kit 
SIoTD Systems of Internet of Things Devices 
SPA Smart Personal Assistants 
SQL Structured Query Language 
SSML Simple Speech Markup Language 
SSMS SQL Server Management Studio 
SWaP Size, Weight, and Power 
TCP Transport Control Protocol 
TLS Transport Layer Security 
UDP User Datagram Protocol 
UFE User-Facing Environment 
U.S. United States 
VM Virtual Machine 
VPN Virtual Private Network 
VUI Voice User Interface 
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